But this isn’t a simple case of passing the buck. The 2018-19 off-season promises perhaps the biggest free agent class ever. It’s such a promising offseason that I can remember hearing about it three or four years ago, which, when you think about it, is ridiculous. Still, there’s a reason for the extreme foresight. In case you’re unaware of the specifics of this class, here is a list of players who will hit the open market after this upcoming season.

• Josh Donaldson
• Charlie Blackmon
• Drew Pomeranz
• Elvis Andrus
• Brian Dozier
• Andrew Miller
• Craig Kimbrel
• A.J. Pollock
• Daniel Murphy
• Marwin Gonzalez
• Gio Gonzalez
• Andrew McCutchen
• Nelson Cruz
• Zach Britton
• Cody Allen
• Adam Jones

Pretty nuts, right? And here’s the part about it that is crazy, bizarro, extreme, Vince-McMahon-rebooting-the-XFL-level nuts: that’s not really the list. Sure, all those guys are going to be free agents after the 2018 season, but I didn’t include three guys of particular note. I’m talking about Bryce Harper, Manny Machado, and Clayton Kershaw. Those three guys are the reason people have been talking about this free agent class for half a decade.

Those are some huge names, some huge players. The thing is, in the case of the first two, both will be 26 years old in 2019 — the first year of their new contracts. Not since Alex Rodriguez signed with the Texas Rangers as a 25-year-old-to be in 2001 have we seen a player with this level of talent enter the market at such a young age. This free agent class has two of those guys. Oh, and also the best pitcher since Pedro Martinez in Kershaw. It’s truly a stacked class, and teams have been planning for it since fans became aware of it, or maybe even before that.

We’re 400 words into this thing and I haven’t yet brought up the Boston Red Sox which is odd since this is a Boston Red Sox website. Like every other team, the Red Sox are aware of this class of players. Like every other team, the Red Sox would love to have many of those players. The luxury tax is preventing that from happening. The total salary expenditure that teams must be below is $197 million. After that, penalties aplenty are levied, which increase each season teams that are over. The Red Sox kept below the luxury tax threshold last season, meaning if they go over this season the penalties aren’t too steep.

Like every other team, the Red Sox would love to have many of those players. The luxury tax is preventing that from happening.

With arbitration raises though last season’s payroll has gone up even though the roster is basically the same, putting the Red Sox over the threshold in 2018. Signing Bryce Harper or Clayton Kershaw would certainly put the Sox over again in 2019 and, considering they’d likely have to put a huge AAV towards doing so, it would contribute to putting them over again in 2020 as well. Should the Red Sox go far over they could lose their first round draft pick in addition to paying a ton of extra money as a tax for spending so much (seriously, players union, WTF?).

The effect of this on the Red Sox is to incentivize them to spend below the tax threshold. The Red Sox already have $92 million locked up in player salaries for the 2019 season, and that’s for just four guys in David Price, Dustin Pedroia, Rick Porcello, and Mitch Moreland. (They’re paying $18.45 million to a fifth in Pablo Sandoval but he’s no longer on the team.) Things get tighter if the Red Sox do shell out another $100+ million deal for J.D. Martinez or another free agent this offseason. That would likely put the Sox over the tax threshold for a second consecutive season, even without signing Harper or another big name from next off-season’s free agent class.

Now, the Red Sox could say, “Screw it, we’re going to put the best team on the field regardless of the luxury tax limit.” But that seems unlikely. The team has spent liberally over the years since John Henry bought them back in 2002, and there’s little reason to expect that not to continue, but asking the team to pay millions for the privilege of paying millions years into the future seems unlikely.

The problem as it stands now is that the team doesn’t have minor league talent that can step in for veterans on expiring contracts, meaning if everything else stays as is, free agents will have to replace free agents. For example, Rick Porcello’s deal is up after the 2019 season which sounds great. Hooray! The Red Sox will have $21 million to use. Except what do you think the going rate for a decent starting pitcher will be in two seasons? I’m guessing it’s going to be a lot, maybe something around $21 million a year. And the Red Sox will also have to replace (or re-sign) Chris Sale and they’ll have already replaced (or re-signed) Drew Pomeranz the season before, likely requiring more money. Boston’s dollars aren’t endless is the point, and guys on cheap deals can’t all be replaced at the top of the market.

One way out for the Red Sox is if David Price opts out of his contract after the 2018 season. If he does, the Red Sox are off the hook for the remaining four years, $127 million. That money could be spent directly on a Kershaw or, probably more likely, Sale.

While the Red Sox could make a run at Kershaw, and damn the luxury tax, the other two generational talents are less likely to sign in Boston. Both Harper and Machado play positions the Red Sox already have covered for the significant future. Machado plays third base where the Red Sox are hoping Rafael Devers will be for the next six seasons. Sure Boston could move him to first or deal him and try to add Machado, but doing that is a significant step towards the luxury tax threshold. Harper seems the more realistic of the two at least in terms of fit, as one of Jackie Bradley or Andrew Benintendi could be moved to make room. And that would be fine. Harper is that good. But the thing is the Red Sox don’t have to do that. They don’t have a hole at third or a hole in the outfield corners, which means they’d be both replacing a good player and doing so by adding one of the biggest contracts in baseball history. Considering their place against the cap (we’re just going to call it what it is, a soft salary cap), doing that seems unlikely.

You never rule it out though. This is the Red Sox. This is Dave Dombrowski. These are great, great players. You never rule it out. But right now, where the Red Sox are, with David Price’s deal on the books until it isn’t, and $18.5 million due to Pablo Sandoval this coming season and the one after it, the arbitration raises coming due, and the lot, it doesn’t seem like the right time for the Red Sox to make a huge addition. All of which means they may just sit out the greatest free agent market of all time.

Or, you know, not.

When you think of a guy you want in the eighth inning, Matt Barnes is far from your first choice, even if you limit it to only Red Sox and exclude Kimbrel as the closer. The relievers you want there can’t crumble under pressure, have some filthy pitches, and can be relied on as a “fireman” pitcher of sorts — to put an end to situations where the opposing team can put your lead to the torch. Barnes definitely had at least one filthy pitch, but the other two parts of that? Not so much. Barnes wasn’t worse than his 2016 self, but he also wasn’t a pitcher you felt comfortable putting in high-leverage situations, and he didn’t do much to keep your heart rate down. That’s the nature of relievers, but for Barnes, it was pretty apparent.

What Went Right

Barnes took notable steps forward from 2016. His strikeout rate rose over four percentage points to 28.9 percent, which was second-best of all relievers on the team. His walk rate dropped a single point to 9.8 percent, which was still mediocre — but it’s an improvement nonetheless! When the time came to eat up innings, Barnes excelled, striking out over 31 percent of batters in low and medium leverage situations, with a combined FIP nearing 3.20. He might not be a fireman, but he’s perfect for the mop-up crew.

His peripherals were solid, with a 3.33 FIP and a 3.22 DRA overall. Barnes also induced groundballs on 48 percent of all contact, easily the best of his career. He also substantially lowered the amount of hard-hit balls as those went below 30 percent of all contact, the first time that number hasn’t hovered around 35 percent in his career. The amount of fly balls dropped for the fourth straight season, and now sits just north of 28 percent. There’s a lot of career numbers here for Barnes, but just by looking at these numbers, he’s a strikeout machine that gets a ton of wormburners. That’ll fly.

Also his signature curveball still has that bite. Not even Brian Dozier can resist swinging when Barnes drops the hammer:

What Went Wrong

Pitching in tough spots isn’t easy to do, but Barnes absolutely crumbled in those situations. When pitching in a high leverage situation this season, Barnes’ strikeout and walk rates dropped to 20.3 percent and 17.1 percent, respectively. He allowed a .404 BABIP, a 8.78 ERA, and batters ripped a line drive on over 33 percent of contact made. Barnes had 13.1 innings pitched in high leverage situations, and he allowed 13 earned runs (14 total!), gave out 10 free passes, 15 hits, and allowed nearly two baserunners per inning. That’s downright ghastly. There’s a lot of credit due to the rest of the Red Sox bullpen for being able to build a bridge to Kimbrel here, since Barnes certainly didn’t make it easy on them.

If the last paragraph’s carnage wasn’t enough for you, Barnes also bought into the retaliation garbage with Manny Machado early in the season:

This is reprehensibly stupid, and Barnes totally deserved to be ejected. Christian Vazquez sets up low and away, and Barnes goes headhunting. For reasons that have been elaborated on by people far smarter than me, don’t ever do this. Or, in Barnes’ case, don’t ever do this again.

What To Expect

Hopefully some progression in the high leverage department. Barnes was truly awful in those few innings, but it’s also just 13 innings. It’s another small sample size, and when you’re dealing with one like that, the potential range of outcomes is pretty vast. He’s better than that, even if he only has his control 50 percent of the time.

Barnes has been improving year by year, and 2017 was mostly good for him. He’s slowly turning into a good reliever, and it’s no fluke. If he can learn to deal with being under pressure, and actually play up to his peripherals, we’ll see him turn in a better year than ever before. If not, well, we’re in for more of the same, which isn’t a bad thing, but it’ll keep him from being anything more than a solid innings eater.

Photo by Winslow Townson — USA TODAY Sports