The Red Sox were playing the Orioles. Jonathan Papelbon, the man who has devolved from making history coming out of a bullpen to living in infamy for what he’s done in a dugout, gave up back-to-back doubles to Chris Davis and Nolan Reimold with two outs, and then Carl Crawford couldn’t handle a sinking liner from The Great (Robert) Andino. Reimold scored. Five minutes later, in a different east coast game, Evan Longoria hit a 317-foot liner into that weird little left field corner in Tropicana Field to cap a comeback from being down 7-0 to the Yankees, and that ended it all. The Red Sox were out of the playoffs.

The stunning part wasn’t that the games ended the way they did – the Red Sox were playing so terribly and the Rays were the exact opposite of that – it was how quickly how the roof caved in on that team. Boston had a 95% win expectancy in that final game! And it was all gone in an improbable instant.

After Mark Reynolds struck out, it took about 15 minutes for the Red Sox to lose everything. Ten minutes to the end of the game, and then five minutes to lose their ticket to October. Some say that’s still the best day of baseball ever, and I’d be inclined to agree with them, despite the debilitating mental trauma it gives me. Normally one game wouldn’t mean much in the long run, but this time, it was wildly different.

The effects of that night were shocking, yet oddly predictable. Apart from losing out on the postseason, the team’s 7-20 record in September probably torpedoed whatever chance Jacoby Ellsbury had at getting an MVP award, despite posting a 30-30 season with stellar defense and 7.91 WARP. Instead, the voters boarded the Justin Verlander hype train and rode it coast-to-coast, giving him and his 7.45 WARP not only the Cy Young, but the MVP award as well. To be fair, Jose Bautista outperformed both of them, but his team didn’t even sniff the playoffs, so that shows you what the voters truly valued here.

Then came the blame game. Smear pieces, chicken and beer, scapegoats, Tito Francona popping pills, you name it. Francona’s option wasn’t picked up either. Then the Cubs offered Theo Epstein the chance to be the greatest general manager in baseball history, and he took it. The Red Sox were handsomely compensated, of course, by getting Chris Carpenter. No, not that one. This one.

You know what happened from then on. Ben Cherington, Bobby Valentine, and whatever the hell 2012 was, for the most part. The Red Sox, who were so stable and so soundly built, just fell apart. Apart from the core of the team, nothing really seemed all that good.

The Nick Punto Trade and 2013 changed that. Cherington dumped a boatload of money on the Dodgers, used it to get useful players (no, not you, Ryan Dempster), and watched nearly half the 25-man roster have the best seasons of their careers. The Red Sox went and won a third title in 10 years with guys that made baseball so damn fun to watch, like Koji Uehara and Mike Napoli. It was exciting, magical, and most of all, it felt like redemption. It was also just one season, and one that wouldn’t be replicated. That isn’t an insult to a World Series-winning team, it’s a realization that it’s incredibly hard to do all of that again and still win it all.

While it’s been good since August 2015, everything between 2013 and that month was mostly bad. Since 2011, the Red Sox haven’t finished a season where they weren’t either first or last place in AL East. The worst-to-first thing was nice in 2013, but the oscillation in success really does a number on the guys in charge. After the 2014 campaign became an injury-plagued mess and the 2015 season crashed and burned in June, Cherington was replaced with Dave Dombrowski. It’s been a ride, to say the least.

The success of the Red Sox in 2016 feels different. The 2011 squad won 90 games, but that record feels hollow, and even more so when you’re looking back on it. This one, with the explosion of youth and the spectacular offense, is like a beginning. Guys like Mookie Betts, Jackie Bradley, Xander Bogaerts, and Andrew Benintendi make this team feel like it’s only starting to do great things, and that says a lot when those four have already combined for 13.7 WARP this season. Hell, Mookie Betts does so many spectacular things that it’s hard to pick just one, but here goes:

David Ortiz, the last man standing from all those near-mythical World Series teams, is playing so well that the statement “he’s having the best final season ever” isn’t hyperbole. Dustin Pedroia didn’t hurt his hand for the billionth time, and now he’s hitting. Hanley Ramirez is barreling up every single thing. The old guard – well, relative to the young guys – is doing amazing stuff again. This is good. This is fun. The best part is that it’s likely to keep happening.

The 2011 Red Sox had a bunch of guys flounder during their tenure on the team, and the 2013 team was good thanks to a lot of short-term additions complementing the players left from the Epstein years. Neither of them looked like they were built for continued success. This year’s team bucks that trend. With all these good young players, these Red Sox are set to be good for a while. The foundation for future teams is there.

I said the 2013 season was like a redemption. The 2016 season is like a rebirth. There’s more here than just one good season. With any luck, they’ll be great again next year, and hopefully a for few years after that. The Red Sox are, truly and thankfully, back.

Photo by Greg M. Cooper/USA Today Sports Images

A quiet day would be an abnormal development for the Red Sox, who are usually active at the deadline, especially since the turn of the century as they’ve consistently made major moves to either boost a playoff-caliber team, or tear apart the bad ones. Many deals succeeded, leading to championship runs. Some failed miserably. Others, well, didn’t do much of anything. Regardless, Theo Epstein, Ben Cherington and Co. were never afraid to pull the trigger.

Today’s trade deadline may leave Red Sox fans underwhelmed, but many deadlines haven’t. Let’s look back at some of those busier deadlines and see just how well (or poorly) they turned out. I present you with the five biggest Red Sox trade deadlines of the 21st century.

5.) 2013

Red Sox acquire right-handers Jake Peavy and Brayan Villarreal, send shortstop Jose Iglesias to the Tigers and send right-handers J.B. Wendelken and Francelis Montas to the White Sox

This trade technically came the day before the 2013 trade deadline, but I make the rules here, and I say that’s good enough to make this list. Anyway, the 2013 Red Sox were in the midst of a worst-to-first turnaround, but needed another starting pitcher for their playoff push. Insert Jake Peavy. The righty gave the Sox just what they needed, posting a 3.82 FIP in 10 regular-season starts and helping them win the World Series. Peavy’s 2013 postseason was less than stellar, but he did start the ALDS clincher against the Rays, allowing just one run on five hits over 5.2 innings. The Red Sox got an ok half season out of Peavy in 2014 before shipping him to the eventual world champion Giants in 2014.

The only notable loss for the Red Sox in that deal was Jose Iglesias, but even his departure wasn’t a major letdown at the time with Stephen Drew and Dustin Pedroia at shortstop and second base, respectively, Will Middlebrooks (sort of) contributing at third and Xander Bogaerts on his way. Iglesias was known primarily for his glove coming through the Sox organization, but was hitting well early on in 2013, posting a .285 TAv in 63 games before being dealt. Iglesias missed all of 2014, owned a .252 TAv in 2015 and has a .243 TAv this season. Meanwhile, Bogaerts could be the one of the best offensive shortstops in the majors for years to come. Safe to say the Red Sox made the right move.

Iglesias still contributed to the 2013 title, by the way.

That led to this:

4.) 2009

Red Sox acquire catcher Victor Martinez from the Indians for right-hander Justin Masterson, left-hander Nick Hagadone and catcher Bryan Price

The playoff-bound Red Sox bolstered their lineup with one big swap, adding Victor Martinez in exchange for Justin Masterson and a pair of prospects. Martinez proved to be a nice addition, as he split time between catcher and first base over 183 regular-season games between 2009 and 2010. Martinez posted a .302 TAv in 237 plate appearances in 2009 and a .281 mark the next year. He didn’t give the Red Sox the postseason production they were hoping for in 2009, collecting just a pair of hits, but that run also lasted just three games.

This trade wasn’t necessarily a win or loss for either team, but it’s safe to say the Indians got more out of the deal. Masterson pitched five solid years in Cleveland, his best being in 2013 when he was the ace of the staff and led the Indians to a postseason berth with a 2.63 DRA and 3.38 FIP. The righty’s career has since flamed out after a disastrous season with the Red Sox in 2015, but the Indians certainly got the best of him.

3.) 2014

Red Sox trade left-hander Jon Lester to the A’s for Yoenis Cespedes and a competitive balance pick; send right-hander John Lackey and left-hander Corey Littrell to the Cardinals for outfielder Allen Craig and right-hander Joe Kelly; trade left-hander Andrew Miller to the Orioles for right-hander Eduardo Rodriguez and send shortstop Stephen Drew to the Yankees for utility infielder Kelly Johnson

Making one major trade at the deadline is big. Two deals is impressive. Four deals in one day is on another level. That’s exactly what the Red Sox did at the 2014 trade deadline as they shipped off a number of veterans over four trades, eyeing the future in the midst of a last-place season.

The Sox’s deadline activity actually began five days earlier when they traded Peavy to the Giants for Heath Hembree and Edwin Escobar. Escobar is no longer with the team, but Hembree has turned into a nice innings eater out of the bullpen. The real fireworks, however, began early on the morning of the deadline when Jon Lester was sent to the A’s for Yoenis Cespedes. Lester was once again pitching like a top-of-the-rotation starter, but the Sox were out of contention and the lefty was in the final year of his contract with no long-term agreement in sight. Cespedes, meanwhile, was a big bat with another year left on his deal. Lester picked up where he left off upon joining the A’s, posting a 2.35 ERA and 3.16 FIP over 11 starts. The Sox pursued Lester in the offseason, but lost out to the Cubs. Cespedes owned a .269 TAv over 213 plate appearances before being dealt to Detroit for Rick Porcello in the offseason. Sure, Porcello doesn’t seem like a stellar return for Lester (although Porcello has been one of their two most dependable starters this season), but they also could have lost the lefty for nothing that offseason had they not traded him.

Then there was the deal we’d all like to forget. That was the deal that brought Allen Craig and Joe Kelly to Boston in exchange for John Lackey. The trade made plenty of sense at the time. Lackey was pitching well, but had little future left in Boston, especially after expressing his displeasure about pitching at the major-league minimum in 2015. Craig was a former All-Star who appeared to be simply having a bad year, while Kelly was young, could throw hard and had shown potential after posting a 2.69 ERA over 15 starts in 2013. Two years later, the deal looks as bad as ever for the Red Sox. Lackey posted a 2.77 ERA while pitching at the minimum for the Cardinals last season. Craig spent most of last season in Triple-A and has since fallen off the face of the earth. Kelly has spent his time with the Red Sox either hurt, or bouncing between Triple-A and the majors.

As dominant as Andrew Miller has been over the last two-plus years, a young pitcher like Eduardo Rodriguez was about the best you were going to get for a rental reliever (how times have changed). The Orioles got the most out of Miller, who owned a 1.16 FIP in 23 appearances with Baltimore in 2014. He’s since become one of the best closers in baseball over the past two seasons. The Red Sox, meanwhile, got a potential middle-of-the-rotation arm for a player they would probably lose to free agency anyway.

The Stephen Drew trade proved to be insignificant. He gave the Yankees an ok season and a half and Kelly Johnson gave the Red Sox next to nothing. However, the trade opened up shortstop for Bogaerts, and we all know how that’s gone.

This deadline was as crazy as it gets for any team. At the time, the Red Sox seemingly won the day, but hindsight shows that not all of it worked out as planned. The Lackey deal is a perfect example of that. However, it would’ve looked worse if the Red Sox lost some of these players to free agency.

2.) 2008

Red Sox acquire outfielder Jason Bay from the Pirates, trade outfielder Manny Ramirez to the Dodgers and send right-hander Craig Hansen and outfielder Brandon Moss to the Pirates

This trade was years in the making. It was far from the first time Manny Ramirez had been part of a trade rumor, and even further from the first time he wanted out of Boston. In 2008, the Red Sox finally pulled the trigger, and got a player in Jason Bay who could fill Ramirez’s void immediately. From a straight trade standpoint, the Red Sox and Dodgers both got solid production for a year and a half of service. Bay posted a .308 TAv in 211 plate appearances with the Sox in 2008, while owning a .302 mark the next season. Ramirez was even more impressive with his .425 TAv in 229 plate appearances with the Dodgers in 2008 and .336 mark in 2009 as LA reached the NLCS both seasons. Ramirez was clearly better than Bay during that time, but by that point he had been nothing but a distraction in Boston and needed to go.

As for the prospects the Red Sox gave up. Craig Hansen’s career continued to be forgettable. Brandon Moss’ career never really materialized until his 2012 arrival in Oakland in 2012, where he totaled 76 home runs over three seasons. Moss, 32, has a .323 TAv and 17 home runs for the Cardinals this season.

1.) 2004

Red Sox acquire shortstop Orlando Cabrera from the Expos and first baseman Doug Mientkiewicz from the Twins, and send shortstop Nomar Garciaparra and outfielder Matt Murton to the Cubs, and acquire outfielder Dave Roberts from the Dodgers for outfielder Henri Stanley

This may go down as the biggest trade deadline in Red Sox history. It was significant enough that they traded, at the time, one of the most iconic players in team history. Add in the fact that it helped propel the Sox to their first World Series title in 86 years and you’re talking about a deadline worth telling your grandkids about.

We start, of course, with the Nomar Garciaparra trade. Garciaparra had been the face of the Red Sox since his 6.0 WARP rookie season in 1997 and a clear fan favorite. He was also really, really good, owning a 43.7 WARP between 1997 and 2003 (keep in mind he missed most of 2001). But by July 2004, he had seemingly overstayed his welcome in Boston. He was in a contract year with no promise of returning, had become a defensive liability and was expected to miss more time with an Achilles injury. Epstein, in a stroke of groinal fortitude, dealt away the superstar in hopes of shoring up the team’s “fatal flaw”: defense.

Epstein got just what he was looking for from Orlando Cabrera. The shortstop’s .268 TAv with the Red Sox was comparable to Garciaparra’s .272 TAv with the Sox in 2004, but he also posted a positive FRAA and played 15 more games than Garciaparra did in the final two months. Cabrera left at the end of the season and the Red Sox began a carousel at shortstop over the next decade, but the championship and Garciaparra’s rapid decline soon after was enough to justify the move.

The Dave Roberts trade was a footnote in the midst of an active deadline, and with good reason. The outfielder made just 101 plate appearances and posted a .251 TAv. He was simply acquired to add speed, defense and depth off the bench. However, Roberts is also responsible for the biggest stolen base in Red Sox history.

***

It’s unlikely the Red Sox will do anything to top these trade deadlines this season. But that’s why a list like this exists. You don’t get fireworks every season. When you consider the moves the Sox have made in the past month, it makes even more sense for this deadline to be a quiet one. That’s not always a bad thing.

 Photo by USA Today Sports Images

Do you remember the end of the book Moneyball?

In 2002 Billy Beane’s A’s won 103 games, the same as the New York Yankees. The Yankees spent $133 million on player payroll. The A’s achieved the same result with $42 million. But the A’s didn’t win in the playoffs, so despite their success in the regular season, it was all a failure. With the season over, Beane slinks back to his office. He knows nothing is going to change and he’s going to have to scale the same impossibly steep mountain all over again. The payroll isn’t going up enough, he’s not getting a raise or a promotion. More of his best players will leave because he can’t afford to pay them. Beane’s reward is nothing. Then he gets a phone call.

The caller offers him a job, a more highly sought after job than his own; one with a raise, a promotion, a much higher payroll, and a better chance to win in the playoffs. Beane takes the job. A few days later he has a change of heart and decides to stay in Oakland with the A’s. That job he eschewed was with the Boston Red Sox. That call was from John Henry.

Beane’s brief time with the Red Sox was over, but Henry’s was just beginning. Although he didn’t get Beane, the path to success in Henry’s mind was clear. Apply the then-nascent field of baseball analytics, the very thought process that helped bring Beane success in Oakland despite their relatively minuscule payroll, to the Boston Red Sox. Build the best analytics team in baseball and the wins will surely follow.

The path to success in Henry’s mind was clear; build the best analytics team in baseball and the wins will surely follow.

Henry didn’t get Beane, so he got the next best thing: his own younger version, 28-year-old Theo Epstein. Unsurprisingly Epstein did many of the things you might have expected Beane would have done. He brought in high on-base percentage guys like Kevin Millar, Bill Mueller, Todd Walker, and David Ortiz. He fired the old school by-the-gut manager (perhaps a year late, but still) and replaced him with someone who was willing and able to incorporate the percentages into his managing. He traded prospects for ace pitcher Curt Schilling, in part by using analytics to convince him a right-handed fly-ball pitcher could thrive in Fenway Park. Oh, and he hired Bill James, the very man whose writing had inspired Beane in the first place.

That was in 2002. Jump forward 13 years and the Red Sox are three-time World Series champions. They’ve also got a meaningfully different front office for the first time since Beane received that phone call. The Red Sox have gone through two GMs in that time, but though Epstein and Ben Cherington were different people (though their voices sounded eerily similar) they both came from the same analytical-bent background, not one that entirely eschewed on-the-ground player evaluation, but one that placed the it next to analytics as equals, two required pieces to complete the championship puzzle.

But then things went awry. The Red Sox finished in last place three out of four years under Cherington, with the final indignity costing Cherington his job. You can certainly point to logical reasons why the team failed on the field and not all of those failures lead straight to bad decisions from the front office, but when Henry looked at the team’s player evaluation processes, he found a fundamental flaw. This led to perhaps the most surprising revelation of the still-young spring when earlier this week John Henry flatly stated that the team had been overly reliant on analytics, and that going forward they would be run differently.

We kind of all saw this coming with the hiring of Dave Dombrowski last season, who is known as a more traditional general manager, but to hear Henry declare it in such stark terms was striking. There is danger in becoming too wedded to any one way of player evaluation and perhaps the Red Sox front offices under Epstein and Cherington had gone too far in one direction. That’s impossible to say from the outside, even when looking at the decisions the team has made. There are just too many moving parts, from player evaluations signings, trades, drafts, and team performance, to look at any organization over a short period of time and make declarative statements about what they do well or what they do poorly. And if there is a scary part of Henry’s statement, that’s it. If the team has moved too far towards analytics, that’s fine, but the answer isn’t to overcompensate in the other direction.

That’s not to say the team won’t win with an analytic-lite philosophy, if that’s their new philosophy at all. Dombrowski has had success in the past with the Marlins and Tigers with exactly this model, building strong teams through scouting that won many games. If the goal is to build a long-term winning organization, it seems pretty clear based on the last two decades worth of data that the smart teams employ both perspectives in roughly equal measure. That isn’t to say you can’t win with just one, or even have sustained success that way, it’s that watching baseball creates perceptions. Analytics challenges those perceptions. It forces people to confront what their eyes are telling them and to explain it with logic and data. Without analytics teams can get caught in a whirlpool of their own unchallenged thoughts and expectations, and that’s a recipe for bad decisions.

Watching baseball creates perceptions. Analytics challenges those perceptions. It forces people to confront what their eyes are telling them and to explain it with logic and data.

Of course, that could happen by using analytics exclusively as well. The challenge the Red Sox face is to learn the proper amount of both and to apply them at the proper time. Perhaps Henry’s statements to the press are just statements to the press and don’t necessarily reflect the reality on the ground. Perhaps Henry thinks what he’s saying is what the fans and media want to hear. But it’s surprising that after almost a decade and a half of analytically driven baseball decision-making, a time in which the Red Sox have won three World Series championships, that Henry has decided to abruptly change course.

The Red Sox do still employ Bill James and they recently created a position for Brian Bannister to analyze pitching using, among other things, analytics, so they certainly aren’t abandoning analytics entirely. Perhaps they’re just being more selective about things. That could be good. But even if the team has indeed grown too reliant on numbers in their decision-making, the mere fact that the Red Sox are moving away from a philosophy that has led to such tremendous success on the field, even if not recently, is concerning. How concerning? As always, the answer isn’t in the results, but in the process.

The baseball season is over, and as it falls into history, the new season steps forward to take its place. This process is essentially instantaneous. The Red Sox went from nothing during the playoffs and World Series to the center of the baseball world in a single click of a second hand. Boston is in the unique position of having a stacked farm system, a talent-laden roster, and a GM who had no part in assembling any of it. As such, he’s not nearly as attached to the players in Boston now, thus making it much easier for him to make them players who used to be in Boston. Dave Dombrowski is here to shake things up.

While there is likely to be much wheeling and dealing, the free agent market hangs over Boston’s head like an axe at a beheading. The reason is simple: the last two Red Sox general managers (generals manager?) lost their job due to their failures in the market.

In 2011 John Lackey was coming off his first season in Boston, a 2010 season that saw him throw 215 innings of 4.40 ERA baseball. His strikeouts dipped and his walks jumped. But improvement was expected! It was then not delivered. In fact, Lackey was even worse, throwing 160 innings with an ERA of 6.41 before getting shut down for Tommy John surgery. Lackey had been GM Theo Epstein’s big addition to the pitching staff and now it looked like the Red Sox would pay Lackey three seasons worth of top-of-the-rotation money for a bit under two seasons of awful pitching. What’s more, had Lackey been anywhere near good the Red Sox would have made the playoffs instead of missing in excruciating fashion on the last day of the season.

Then there was Carl Crawford. Crawford showed up to Boston with a new seven year $142 million contract having forgotten how to hit and field. In April Crawford hit .155/.204/.227 and there was no looking back. He wasn’t exactly horrible with the bat after that though he wasn’t fantastic either, but he the overall appearance was a shell of the player who had played All Star-caliber baseball in Tampa just the season before. This was Theo Epstein’s big addition to the offense. Then Crawford got hurt, which, purely from an on-field standpoint, was probably for the best. It was those failures along with some others that signaled the end of Epstein’s time in Boston and with him fellow 2004 hero manager Terry Francona.

Epstein was the GM who had ended the curse not once, but twice. He’d bested the Yankees, he’d built the team and franchise he’d set out to build, and he’d made the Red Sox the greatest organization in baseball from the time he’d taken over to then. But after Crawford and Lackey showed up and sucked horribly, he was gone. That’s a bit of a simplification of course, but it’s roughly correct. Without Epstein’s failures in the free agent market, it’s entirely possible he might still be here.

Time waits for nobody, and in fact, it speeds up like hell when you’re a GM who just gave $90 million to a guy who can’t hit or field.

But he left and was replaced by assistant GM Ben Cherington. Cherington’s Red Sox finished in last place in his first season in charge. Then he hit the market hard. He brought in Stephen Drew, Mike Napoli, Jonny Gomes, Shane Victorino, Mike Carp, David Ross, Ryan Dempster, and Koji Uehara. That team won the World Series. Cherington didn’t hit fully on each player, but he got something productive out of each, and in the world of free agency that’s no sure thing. Cherington had turned to the market, supplemented the talent on hand with free agents, and won a World Series. Then 2014 happened and the team failed on the field once again.

Following that failure, for the 2015 season, Cherington decided he needed to upgrade the talent on hand. He went back to the free agent market to bring in Hanley Ramirez, Pablo Sandoval and Justin Masterson. As it turned out, all were horrific failures on a scale that seemingly couldn’t be predicted (maybe Masterson could have). The team cut Masterson mid-season but Sandoval and Ramirez were and are on long term contracts. And they were and are both awful. And the Red Sox finished last again. And that was it, the GM lost his job. Again. Less than two seasons removed from mastering the market and winning a World Series, Cherington had been given the boot hard.

Like Epstein before him, that was it. Unlike Epstein, there wasn’t really any other reason. Epstein squabbled with team president Larry Lucchino, had recently failed in the draft, and a few of his contract extensions were looking like expensive busts. Cherington had no such baggage. He was put out on his backside mostly because Pablo Sandoval went from above average hitter and above average fielder to downright awful at both as soon as he put on a Red Sox uniform. Hanley Ramirez, beyond April when he crushed homer after homer, stopped hitting and put on a display of fielding in left that would make little league teams look away.

Over the next few weeks and months you’re going to hear the Red Sox connected with just about every free agent there is. There will be David Price rumors, Zack Greinke meetings, Johnny Cueto whisperings, anonymous mentions of Jordan Zimmermann, and outright discussions of Chris Davis, Darren O’Day, and anyone else who plays baseball and has no contract. Dombrowski has his preferences and he will try to remake Boston’s roster in that image over the off-season and as he’s already said, that image includes a top-of-the-rotation starting pitcher. He may want to upgrade the offense with something more certain at first base than Hanley Ramirez, who it just seems like the Red Sox would rather pay to explore water on Mars than to play first base for them next season. It’s possible Dombrowski can do all this through trades but that seems unlikely. He’s probably going to have to sign a free agent or two. Or six.

If Dombrowski is going to give $200 million to David Price or $150 million to Johnny Cueto or whoever or whatever, he had better be certain. No, scratch that. He’d better be whatever word means three times the power of ‘certain’ before doing so. He just got here, and guys who just arrived typically get some time before being held to the fire, but Ben Cherington won a World Series two years ago. Two years ago! Two! And he’s now a visiting professor at Columbia University. Time waits for nobody, and in fact, it speeds up like hell when you’re a GM who just gave $90 million to a guy who can’t hit or field.

If Dombrowski wants to remake the roster and win now at the expense of tomorrow, he’d better be sure about the choices he makes when it comes to free agents. What I’m saying is Dave Dombrowski had better be immune to iocane powder.

Photo by Mark L. Baer/USA Today Sports Images

Yesterday it was announced the Red Sox had hired a new GM. The answer we’ve all been waiting for arrived and, good news, it is an answer we should all be happy to hear. New GM Mike Hazen won’t have the same kind of power as the previous GMs working under John Henry’s ownership group. He’ll be working under Dave Dombrowski, who will set the tone for the organization, as well as pull the trigger on trades, free agent signings, and the like. The significance in this hiring isn’t who will hold the power. We already know Dombrowski holds the power. The significance isn’t Hazen. It’s Dombrowski and whether he recognizes, appreciates, and intends to perpetuate what the organization he’s joined does well.

Dave Dombrowski took over a team and an organization that, more than anything, was down on its luck. GM Ben Cherington was (and still is) just two measly years off of winning a World Series. The organization was routinely ranked among the best if not the best when it comes to minor league talent. There were certainly potholes to fix, but this was hardly a broken situation, and hardly comparable to the one Dombrowski took over when he inherited a Tigers club bereft of talent both on the major league roster as well as all throughout the organization. That organization required a complete overhaul of the way business was conducted and the people who conducted that business. This is not that.

But me writing that sentence doesn’t mean Dombrowski agrees with it. Many new bosses come in to a new job and instinctively want to change everything, move the plants around, get new furniture in the lunch room, and fire everyone. The instinct isn’t necessarily a bad one, either.

I was put in a similar situation once, where I took control of an office staffed with people who weren’t performing as they should have been. I interviewed the out-going boss and he, quite candidly I thought, said, “Yeah, you’re going to have to get some new people in here.” He meant that over time I was going to have to get rid of everyone and bring in new people, people who would be my people, who would be loyal to me, who wouldn’t see me as an outsider who did things differently or wrong, but as the person who gave them a job.

In many ways the Red Sox aren’t a comparable situation to the one I experienced. They do things well, many things in fact, but it would be easy, understandable, reflexive even, if Dombrowski stepped in and instinctively wanted to blow the whole thing up, from players, to front office executives, to scouts, to the janitorial staff. Sweep it all out, bring in new people who weren’t familiar with the old ways, who when asked to do something wouldn’t think, “this isn’t as good as it was back when Ben was running things.”

Hazen’s hire also says something else about Dombrowski; that he is willing to learn.

Hazen’s hire also says something else about Dombrowski; that he is willing to learn. Hazen is 39 years old. He’s a baby in terms of baseball executives. But with that newness comes a different way of looking at things. The Red Sox have been, since John Henry bought the club, an organization that put a heavy emphasis on analytics. The hiring of Dave Dombrowski put that continued emphasis into some doubt. Had Dombrowski hired Wren or Bowden or someone of that ilk, that would have represented the organization stepping back away from analytics. Hazen isn’t some quant from a back room with eight pocket protectors and calluses built up from punching numbers into a spreadsheet, but he is a guy who has worked with the Red Sox since 2006. He knows the Red Sox ways, and promoting him is an implicit endorsement of those ways, one of which is using analytics to give a certain perspective in decision making.

There is another aspect to it all though, a more personal one. Hazen grew up rooting for the Red Sox. He grew up loving the team as a kid, just like the men who sat in his chair before him, Theo Epstein and Ben Cherington, did. He understands Boston and Red Sox fans because he’s from here. He is one. But that’s just a story. It’s a beautiful story, and one that’s enduring, but narrative won’t help the organization make better decisions or make the team better on the field. What makes the hiring of Hazen an exciting hire has little to do with Hazen himself, who is likely a smart, go-getter, full of vigor and bright ideas, and what have you. That all might be true. Or not! We can’t say for sure since we’ve never seen Hazen perform at this level before, though his resume is promising.

We might not know Hazen well, but if there is one aspect of Hazen’s personality Boston fans can all get behind, it’s his loyalty. The word keeps coming up in others’ descriptions of him. He has had, it seems, many chances to further his career by leaving Boston, but he has repeatedly opted to stay despite that. The Red Sox are in his blood, and if you’re reading this, you can probably relate to that. If not, it’s still understandable that that’s an easy thing to root for, as fan. It’s one of the reasons Theo Epstein was so beloved (the other being that whole 2004 thing).

It’s an exciting day because we fans are still learning about the man who runs our franchise, who will guide us through what promises to be a tumultuous off-season. We are still learning about him and learning to trust him. So hiring Mike Hazen as GM is exciting because of what it says about Dombrowski. Dombrowski isn’t insecure in his position, he’s willing to listen to the opinions of others, and that he’s strong enough that he doesn’t need to change things in Boston just to make them different than they were. Evaluate everything, but if it was working before, that’s great, keep it working that way.

Hazen’s tenure as GM will likely rise or fall on the strength of Dave Dombrowski’s choices, so it’s relieving to see what this hire says about him as a man, as a boss, and as the head of the Boston Red Sox baseball operations staff. Change is never easy, but with Hazen in the fold, Dave Dombrowski’s Red Sox are off to a fine start.

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