As you can see, on-base percentage is also down this year from last year, but not to the extent of slugging, which is down almost 50 points. The drop is not just the lack of David Ortiz. With the exception of the catchers, each of the everyday guys is slugging at a lower rate than they did last year.

The decline in slugging this year is interesting on its own, but the (possible) downstream effect of increasing aggressiveness on the bases makes it even more interesting. This year the Red Sox are one of the most aggressive teams on the bases. They have attempted 112 stolen bases (nabbing 85 of them), sixth-most in baseball. They have taken an extra base (i.e., advanced two bases on a single, three bases on a double) 42 percent of the time, also sixth-highest in baseball. They have advanced on fly balls, passed balls, and wild pitches 152 times, second-most in baseball. They are undoubtedly making an effort to push bags, but it has not come without a cost. In addition to those positive baserunning items, Baseball Reference tracks Outs On Bases (OOB) and the Red Sox are on the wrong end of it. They have already made 69 OOB, easily the highest amount in baseball. Add in the 27 times they were caught stealing and the six times they have been picked off, and you have over one hundred guys on base turned into outs. Compare these to last year and you find:

Keep in mind the 2017 Red Sox still have a month to play, but have already surpassed last year’s squad in all but extra-base taken percentage (XBT%) and pickoffs. I did not recall noticing how often the Red Sox were picked off last year. In any case, those numbers are remarkable. And, according to Brian Butterfield, the coach leading the charge of aggressiveness on the bases, it is all part of a plan to adapt from being a team that is station-to-station and relies on hitting the ball into the seats.

I understand the sentiment and the desire to be a multi-faceted offense that puts pressure on the defense and manufactures runs. What’s more is that when you are a lower scoring team, these sorts of tactics make more sense than when you are high-scoring outfit. While outs are always precious, for groups that struggle to score, each out has less run-purchasing power, so to speak. As evidence of this, take an overly simplified example using run expectancy. In 2015, a low-scoring run environment (4.31 R/G), the cost (in run expectancy, RE) of a runner getting caught stealing second with no outs and nobody else on base was 0.586 runs. Contrast that with 2004, a high run scoring environment (4.88 R/G), where it was 0.634 runs. Not coincidentally, the difference in league-wide run scoring between 2015 and 2004 (0.57 R/G) is close to the difference between the 2017 and 2016 Red Sox teams (0.54 R/G), so the example is relevant. It means that the extra outs on the bases made by this year’s team (relative to last year’s group) could end up costing the same amount in terms of run expectancy. Making an out is costly, it is just slightly less so for a team that tends to score less (perhaps because they don’t sock dingers). So there is some logic behind the plan to implement greater aggression on the bases with this low-slugging 2017 squad. But, while that sounds nice, they aren’t even doing it well compared to last year: By Baseball Prospectus’ Baserunning Runs, the high scoring 2016 Red Sox were basically average on the bases (0.6 BRR) and this 2017 group is considerably below average (-6.9 BRR).

Stealing bases and taking the extra bag as often as possible can help run scoring and is fun to watch as a fan, but doing so won’t turn a pumpkin into a stagecoach.

There is a notion that things like baserunning, hitting for contact, and small ball strategies become stronger assets in the playoffs. After all, the temperature drops and the quality of pitching increases, so big bopping offenses will be neutralized, right? Butterfield suggests as much in his explanation for encouraging the team to run wild. But the reality is that there isn’t good evidence to support this as true. Rather, it is the teams that hit the ball out of the yard that tend to succeed in October. As Joe Sheehan enjoys saying: Ball go far, team go far. Even those plucky 2014 and 2015 Kansas City Royals teams who changed baseball forever with their contact-prowess and aggressive running, actually did a lot of their playoff winning by (uncharacteristically) hitting a bunch of home runs. Nevertheless, Eric Hosmer’s dash home and Lucas Duda misfiring a throw is what gets remembered.

Relying on baserunning is a really difficult way to make an offense go. Stealing bases and taking the extra bag as often as possible can help run scoring and is fun to watch as a fan, but doing so won’t turn a pumpkin into a stagecoach. Getting guys on base frequently and then moving those guys around with hits (even the ones that go over the fence) are the critical elements in a good offense. Doing either of those things at a low rate makes it hard to score, as it has been for the Red Sox this season. Butter’s plan might sound good and even have some run expectancy logic behind it, but ultimately it won’t be enough to carry this team through October.

Xander Bogaerts is not who we thought he was. At least not yet.

Billed as a power-hitting wunderkind who could fake it at short but was destined for third base, Bogaerts functioned as a line-drive hitter and good defensive shortstop in 2015. This was a massive improvement from 2014, of course, when Bogaerts didn’t function as an impatient batter, couldn’t make high-pressure throws and was as crippled by the existence of a Drew brother as anyone this side of Dennis and Callahan.

So, how do you evaluate a post-uber-prospect who provides a ton of value at a young age but who doesn’t provide it in the ways you thought he would? Good question! I look forward to finding out.

WHAT WENT RIGHT IN 2015

So many things. It’s tempting to start with defense, but let’s start with the bat. Xander hit .320/.355/.421 last season, good for a wRC+ of 109 and a BWARP of 3.5. Yes, he rode a .372 BABIP and yes, his BB% fell to 4.9, but this is the positive section, damnit, so let’s also mention his 10/12 SB/CS, his 32.0% Oppo%, his new swing and his .365/.424/.468 overall line against southpaws.

For a little league-wide context, Xander finished fifth overall in average (second in the AL) and was the 41st-hardest qualified batter to strike out. He hit the most doubles (35) among all shortstops and the second-most hits of anyone in the AL. The average MLB shortstop hit .256/.307/.375. Again, Xander hit .320/.355/.421. Let’s put that in a chart:

Xander was really good, you guys.

You see how I compared Bogaerts to other shortstops above? The reason that’s so great is because Bogaerts is at least a clear-cut average defensive shortstop now — maybe even better — and that was fairly unfathomable about 12 months ago. We can touch on defensive metrics (-2.7 UZR, -10.4 FRAA in ‘14, 1.0 UZR, -1.4 FRAA in ‘15), but all you really need is the eye test. Bogaerts appeared infinitely more comfortable ranging to his right, was much more reliable on difficult, rushed throws and had the overall look of a legitimate field general that he so sorely lacked as he stumbled between shortstop and third base in his rookie season. See what I mean?

Is Brian Butterfield the GOAT? Brian Butterfield might be the GOAT.

Anyway, you add all this up and Xander was the third-best shortstop in the league by fWAR and the fourth best shortstop in the league by BWARP. Not bad for a kid who turned 23 in October.

WHAT WENT WRONG IN 2015

Where’d your power go, dude? After slugging 12 homers and posting a .123 ISO in his down 2014 season, Xander hit just seven homers and posted a .101 ISO last year. Those are odd numbers for a manchild who posted ISOs in the 200s all throughout his MiLB career until Pawtucket.

As we mentioned above, there’s also the matter of Xander’s .372 BABIP and  his 4.9 BB%, plus the fact that his LD% only increased one percentage point between 2014 and 2015. If you go by TAv, Bogaerts was only at .266 last year. Are we nitpicking? Yes, but it’s certainly worth mentioning that not every peripheral indicates that Bogaerts is due for a repeat in 2015, as horrible person but occasionally adept writer Matt Collins outlined here.

In a nutshell, nothing went wrong for Bogaerts in 2015. We just don’t know how right it will go in the future.

OUTLOOK FOR 2016

There are a few intriguing possibilities in play here. The first is that 2015 represents who Xander really is now; a high-average, doubles-power, 45/50-grade defensive shortstop with upside. Perhaps not a transcendent player, but certainly a building block.

The other option? Bogaerts learns how to balance his contact-based approach while tapping into some of his sweet, beautiful, effortless power, turning several of his doubles into homers and becoming a true stud. Imagine, say, .290/.340/.500 from a solid defensive shortstop? That’s just short of Vintage Tulo, and just short of Vintage Tulo is the upside we’re looking at here. *There is a third option — Bogaerts could regress.

Maybe Bogaerts won’t make huge gains in 2016. He’s still just 23, and it’s entirely possible that he won’t hit his offensive stride for two or three more years. But he’s shown the poise, improvement and natural abilities to continue to challenge Mookie Betts as Boston’s best young player, and he’s damn close to becoming a household name even outside of New England.

Told you so.

Photo by Brad Rempel/USA Today Sports Images