Matsuzaka’s contract expired after the 2012 season, and the Red Sox paused with Dice-K in the mirror only slightly longer than the Fresh Prince, signing Rusney Castillo to a seven year, $72.5M deal that was strikingly similar to Matsuzaka’s six year, $52M pact. Once again, the team set a record for signing an international player, granting the largest guarantee to a Cuban player up to that point. And once again, differences between the game in a player’s home country and MLB could be the difference between a very good player and a merely useful one for the Red Sox.

Once again, differences between the game in a player’s home country and MLB could be the difference between a very good player and a merely useful one for the Red Sox.

NPB is more insular than MLB, with a four-foreigner limit on rosters. Even NPB can’t hold a candle to Cuba’s Serie Nacional, however, which is organized in a way more closely resembling high school ball in the U.S. Throughout Castillo’s time in Cuba, teams were drawn from the region in which they played, resulting in a more idiosyncratic game. In 2014, Baseball America’s Ben Badler discussed several of those consequences, which included players working a positions they’d never sniff in a system of drafting, trading and organized minors.

At the time, Badler observed that he could “count on one hand the number of pitchers who can throw 95 mph,” later adding that the prevalence of mid- to  high- 80s mph pitchers led to an unusual number of long swings. Could that be part of what we’re seeing with Rusney Castillo, who put up an underwhelming .647 OPS in 80 MLB games last year, and an only marginally better .722 OPS in 40 games with Pawtucket?

Baseball-Reference publishes a power/finesse split that aggregates a player’s stats against the top third, middle third and bottom third of pitchers, according to K% plus BB%. “Finesse” pitchers are therefore pitchers that see the ball put in play more often than most. League averages against “power” pitchers lag a little behind the numbers for the other two thirds of pitchers, but Rusney did struggle more than most, to the tune of a .451 OPS and particularly putrid .188 batting average in a smallish 84 PA against those pitchers. Against the middle third, Castillo had a .721 OPS (97 PA) — and against “finesse” pitchers, Castillo finished 2015 at .735 (108 PA).

Some of the above are small samples cut into even smaller samples, but from what I can tell, these splits are anything but random; David Ortiz’s “power” pitcher OPS has lagged behind his other marks by .100 or more basis points in nearly every season, for example. There’s a lot of overlap between these splits and hitters’ ground ball/fly ball rates, and (especially) contact rates, each of which are also fairly consistent year to year.

Even if we consider Castillo’s struggles against “power” pitchers as meaningful, that’s not necessarily the same thing as struggling against power pitchers, or power pitches. Per Baseball Savant, Castillo was served 127 fastballs at 94+ mph last year, with a 53% swing rate and a fairly high whiff rate of 24% of swings. Against fastballs 93 mph or slower, Castillo had a significantly lower 47% swing rate — and a substantially better whiff rate of 17% of swings.

The rest of the Red Sox had less swing and miss in their game overall, with a 15% whiffs per swing rate on fastballs 94+ mph, and 12% on fastballs 93 mph or slower. On a percentage basis, the difference for the rest of the team was not more dramatic than that for Castillo, and it’s worth noting that the rest of the team had a K% against “power” pitchers almost identical to that of Castillo (both 28%).

Castillo’s swing looks long, and in his brief career, it’s looked from his numbers against “power” pitchers that his stat sheet might reflect a long swing. Failing to catch up with high heat is also something one might expect in 2015 after not playing as a professional in 2013 or most of 2014, though, and at this point, Castillo’s struggles against “power” pitchers could be luck. Still, if Castillo is a liability against high K+BB pitchers, he may still have to play against them: 4th outfielder and fellow right-handed hitter Chris Young has also struggled against “power” pitchers in his career, if not to the same degree as Castillo (and both been much more successful against ground ball pitchers). It’s early to raise the alarm, but a good time to continue to monitor.

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Maybe it wasn’t.

I’m not saying he was secretly good out there—that would be one hell of a secret. And I’m not saying it’s up in the air, because 747.2 innings is such a small sample—it is, but not so small that defensive metrics this extreme aren’t meaningful. What I am saying is that even after adjustments, defensive metrics may have been unfair to Red Sox left fielders, making a very bad season look so bad that it’s hard to believe.

Take out both Ramirezes, and Red Sox left fielders have a -7.3 UZR/150 that would still rank dead last in all of baseball over the last 14 years.

Maybe we need to leave this at the feet of a different Ramirez, to some extent: Manny Ramirez was installed in left field when advanced defensive statistics were first publicly reported, and in 6,478.2 career innings in left for the Red Sox, he managed a -21.0 UZR/150 and looked like a bad fielder. Manny’s stats passed the smell test. And for every other left fielder to have logged 1,000 or more innings in left for the Red Sox, there seemed to be some other way to explain the negative defensive statistics away. Jason Bay and Jonny Gomes were never that great defensively anyway. Carl Crawford was getting older, and had trouble adjusting. Daniel Nava got bounced around too much.

But maybe it’s more than that. Take out both Ramirezes, and Red Sox left fielders have a -7.3 UZR/150 that would still rank dead last in all of baseball over the last 14 years.* Has the team been more comfortable putting bad fielders there than other teams? Maybe. But with all due respect to the ghost of Brian Daubach’s career, it seems unlikely that after taking out two of the team’s worst fielders, the remaining left fielders were still worse than everyone else.

*Note: I got this number after applying some high school algebra to numbers that were already rounded, so it may not be exact—but there’s a lot of room between -7.3 UZR/150 over 13,052.2 innings and the -6.1 UZR/150 Phillies.

Just like Defensive Runs Saved, Ultimate Zone Rating is mostly a function of its range component, RngR. Among the other components, the effect of an outfielder’s arm (ARM) and the effect of boneheaded or inspired plays (ErrR) are next-most important. You should care, because in RngR, the chasm between the Red Sox and the next-worst team is mind numbing: -157.9 RngR to the Phillies’ -112.4 RngR. And just as Fenway taketh away, it also giveth. The Red Sox rank a little differently in ARM than they do in UZR/150 overall, as I’ve once again shown elegantly with a red arrow drawn on a touchpad:

Caveat time: I’m not able to find home/road splits for UZR (or DRS), so if what we’re getting after here really is about Fenway, the effect might be twice the size of what it looks like. Also, how UZR treated left at Fenway was tweaked when the park factors used were made more sophisticated before the 2010 season. It’s probably no accident that among the left fielders with at least 200 innings for the Red Sox, many of  the positive marks came from the last few seasons: Jackie Bradley Jr., Rusney Castillo, Yoenis Cespedes, Alejandro De Aza and Brock Holt. Some of this information is still useful, though, for estimating the size of the grain of salt we should take with Hanley Ramirez’s stats last year.

This graph doesn’t tell you how many innings each of these left fielders actually had (see for yourself, if you like), but you get the picture. Some usual suspects, but a few surprises, as well.

Hanley rated worse than Manny did over his career in left, but the -31.9 UZR/150 was hardly unprecedented: Manny’s -33.8 UZR/150 in 2006 was worse. The main difference between them was the extent to which they affected the game with their throwing arms. We don’t have UZR for Manny’s first season in 2001, but in 2002, he didn’t do so hot in ARM: -4.1, almost as bad as Yoenis Cespedes was good in his limited time. After 2002, though, Manny put up a 13.5 ARM, putting a serious dent in his shortcomings with range.

Manny didn’t do dramatically better in left for the Dodgers than he did for the Red Sox, but he did do better, and that was despite seeing his ARM marks go negative once he got there. Looking only at RngR, Manny got worse as he got older: -2.5 ARM in 2002, when he was still DHing, then -9.6, -13.0, and a whopping -30.1 in 2005 when he set his career-high for innings. In Manny’s No Good, Terrible, Very Bad Year in 2006 his RngR was -27.7 (which was actually worse, given a 200 inning drop), and the -13.8 he ended up with in 2007 could have been a real improvement, luck, or both. In the year he split with the Dodgers, though, he improved to -9.5, about where he was in his first full UZR year in left in 2002 in a handful fewer innings. His -4.6 RngR in 2009 is astonishing, even if it was in just 812 innings—and his -3.2 in 2010 in 359.2 innings is almost as surprising. Basically, Manny left Fenway, and then his range was only about one third as bad as it was with the Red Sox. In 2009, the man turned 37 years old.

Manny left Fenway, and then his range was only about one third as bad as it was with the Red Sox. In 2009, the man turned 37 years old.

But wait—there’s more. Carl Crawford was a great left fielder for Tampa Bay; for all of his full seasons, he had a RngR of between 11.7 and 16.5, except for one season. Preceding his Red Sox tenur, Crawford had that 16.5 RngR and then a 14.9 … and then seemed to flush himself down the toilet with a -1.5 RngR in his only full season with Boston (his partial 2012 was also essentially a zero). Back playing left for the Dodgers in 2013, he had a 9.1 RngR in a not-quite-full season’s worth of playing time, essentially picking right back up where he left off for the Rays.

Not sold yet? Then take the left fielder with the second-most innings out there in the UZR era. Daniel Nava’s -7.7 UZR/150 in left was nothing to write home about either way and his 1,702.2 innings were about a thousand short of the sample size we generally consider meaningful. Still, Nava buoyed that number with a 5.1 ARM, and his -14.4 RngR was… not good. But Nava didn’t just play left—he also played 1117 innings of right field, where he had a positive 4.5 RngR and 9.9 UZR/150. Better than J.D. Drew in right, and yet almost as far below average in left as he was above average in right.

A big part of the Green Monster tradeoff is the ability to help control baserunners, but it’s possible that learning to throw from Fenway’s left field requires some kind of adjustment (especially if one is learning the outfield for the first time). Even in the context of Red Sox left fielders, Hanley Ramirez’s -10.5 RngR in just over a half-season of work was flat-out bad. His ridiculously awful -7.3 ARM in the same span is what made his UZR/150 that next level of awfulness, though, and the similar marks for DRS told a similar story (-10 rPM, -5 rARM). It’s possible that learning to throw from the outfield was especially challenging for Ramirez, but ARM is mostly inferential—it is affected by what baserunners try as much as what they try unsuccessfully. A few well-publicized gaffes in the outfield early in the season very well could encouraged runners to try to take extra bases much more often, and then the problem may have snowballed, with the “right” throwing decisions changed for Ramirez.

Balls that hit the wall and aren’t catchable by BIS’s estimation aren’t included in UZR’s RngR calculations. So what gives? I don’t have an explanation, and as I’m not half as smart as Mitchel Lichtman, I wouldn’t deign to suggest there’s an obvious problem in the metrics. It does seem like something is here, though, and it might be as simple as what happens to Coors Field hitters, with home/road adjustments making for a harder row to hoe overall. For now, though, I feel like we don’t necessarily need to heap so much abuse on our man Hanley. And it may be wise to temper our defensive stats expectations for Rusney Castillo and Chris Young this year as well.

Photo by Mark L. Baer/USA Today Sports Images

As a silver-ish lining to the 2012 chicken-and-beer collapse, the Red Sox picked as high as seventh in a draft for the first time in 2013 since selecting Trot Nixon in 1993. Their prize was Trey Ball, a 6’6” high school outfielder and southpaw who signed for an under-slot $2.75M.

Now 21 years old and with a second full season of experience as a pro, Ball is still more project than projectable. And while the Red Sox probably didn’t expect that he’d be anchoring the rotation in 2016, they probably did expect that he’d figure in somewhere in the team’s top ten prospects at this point (spoiler alert).

What Went Right in 2016

The profile that led the Red Sox to gamble on Ball is still intact. Mixed into his 4.73 ERA in 25 starts overall were a handful of strong games, especially in the middle of the year, when Ball seemed to take a step forward. In June, Ball pitched to a 1.59 ERA in 28.1 innings, including his longest start of the year (6.2 IP) and a dominant performance in which the Indiana native punched out nine hitters in the Cleveland organization.

The BP prospect staff checked in with Ball when things looked like they were starting to click, posting a mixed bag review that raised an eyebrow in a good way. The staff saw a delivery that was repeated more consistently than in his first season—an important development for a pitcher whose main shortcoming has been command. The 88-91 mph fastball would leave Ball a tick below average for a major league lefty, but the 92 mph he flashed would be average or better. And while Ball’s loopy curve was still inconsistent, he showed something tighter at times, a pitch that could finally be thrown for strikes, earlier in the count.

What Went Wrong in 2015

You kinda sorta did the math in your head: if Ball had a 1.59 ERA in June and a 4.73 ERA overall, the rest of Ball’s year was less than inspiring. That 5.61 ERA (I know you didn’t actually do the math) was probably a better reflection of who Ball was on the mound last year: an athlete with an unathletic delivery and very iffy command who sometimes looked the part but couldn’t count on his fastball or his out pitch.

There are pitchers in the majors who get by with a walk rate only slightly better than Ball’s 4.18 BB/9 last year, but there’s every reason to think he was at High-A last year specifically to work on his command; it wasn’t a pitching style, but a technical problem. There’s still plenty of time for Ball to put it together, but mastering his own body will not necessarily get easier as it changes.

BP’s Chris Crawford wrote of Ball’s 2016 that his “secondary offerings haven’t made any real progress.”

The very real potential for improvement is great—few mortals have the ceiling that Ball still has right now. Having plenty of time to improve, though, doesn’t make up for making essentially no progress at all in 2016. In high school, Ball had a useable curveball and a changeup with potential; BP’s Chris Crawford wrote of Ball’s 2016 that his “secondary offerings haven’t made any real progress.” As Crawford noted, “[a]dd in well-below-average control and command, and you get a guy who is closer to non-prospect than prospect.”

Outlook for 2016

Ball doesn’t need to make The Leap to stay on the prospect radar a year from now—he just needs some of that “real progress.” The Red Sox bet big that Ball’s athleticism would allow him to overcome his rawness, and that’s still what they’ll be waiting on as the 2016 season gets underway. Time is not necessarily on the team’s side with Ball, who may not be moved up a rung to Double-A in 2016 until he shows better command. The Red Sox will not have to add Ball to the 40-man next November, but his brief time in rookie ball in 2013 made that season a “qualified season” for purposes of the Rule 5 draft—he’ll be eligible for the Rule 5 draft in 2017 at the ripe age of 23 unless he gets protected.

It’s hard to continue to bet on a pitcher who needs to make several kinds of improvements at once, but is that what it would take for Ball to be relevant for the Red Sox? The report last June, days before he became old enough to drink, noted that Ball’s 6’6” frame still offered plenty of room to add strength. When Ball grows into his body, even a small spike in velocity could make him a candidate for messy but competent innings.

That same process could also pay real dividends for Ball in terms of control, not just because the strike zone would become a more hospitable place to work. Control problems seem to stem from difficulty repeating a delivery when tired, as the prospect staff wrote in June that Ball struggled to repeat as he got deeper into the game. It all adds up to back-burner status for Ball, but the right kind of progress will be physical—and that could show up on the mound well before we see it in the stat sheet.

Photo by Kelly O’Connor/www.sittingstull.smugmug.com

For all his “struggles” in 2015, we’re really only talking one or two home runs too many in April of that season: Kimbrel was exactly as dominant the rest of the year as we’ve seen him now for six seasons running. You can’t fake your way to a 1.63 career ERA in almost 350 career innings; that’s the kind of ERA mark that a great reliever gets in a single season with tons of good luck. What Kimbrel has done in the majors is mind-boggling.

Kimbrel has gotten by with a surprisingly simple approach at the plate.

How has he done it? Very unlike Pedro, Kimbrel has gotten by with a surprisingly simple approach at the plate. For the most part, it’s fastballs early and the big-breaking knuckle curve late when Kimbrel is ahead, which is often. It seems like hitters should be able to sit on one pitch or the other, and yet success against Kimbrel seems accidental when it happens. The best thing about having two nearly unhittable pitches is … that they’re nearly unhittable.

Kimbrel’s fastball isn’t all that special in terms of movement; nearly 6 inches of arm-side run and about 9 inches of “rise” is not atypical, given his velocity. In addition to hitting spots, however, it’s that velocity that has Kimbrel’s fastball standing apart. Among pitchers who threw at least 500 fourseam fastballs last year, Kimbrel had the fourth-highest average velocity. Per Brooks Baseball, at release Kimbrel maxed out over 100 mph on the fastball for all but one month last season. What’s strange is that his velocity has only gone up in his six MLB seasons.

You’ll note that Kimbrel’s curveball is also thrown with unusual velocity; he averaged a bizarre 87.8 mph out of his hand in 2015. Among pitchers who threw a curve at least 200 times in 2015, that velocity wasn’t just fast; it was over 1 mph faster than the next-highest average speed (Cody Allen), which was in turn over 1 mph faster than the third-highest. What is truly amazing is that the speed does not come with a price, in terms of movement. It doesn’t move as much horizontally, but Kimbrel’s curve breaks downward almost exactly as much, on average, as Rich Hill’s curveball — despite coming in more than 11 mph hotter.

In 2015, Kimbrel’s curve usage was up somewhat to just over 30% of pitches, his fastball coming in at just under 70% of the time. Despite his overall domination and limited repertoire, however, Kimbrel does change his two-pitch approach based on the handedness of the hitter.

Against lefties, Kimbrel follows the customary plan for getting guys out: get ahead with the fastball, then go for the jugular with a breaking ball. Lefties saw a first pitch fastball 76% of the time in 2015, and when they did, Kimbrel stayed down and stayed away. Pitching to his arm side was Kimbrel’s strategy overall facing lefties; he threw “away” over 63% of the time, on the inside third of the plate (or off of it) just over 15% of the time. Even when he was throwing his curve against lefties in 2015, Kimbrel didn’t aim for their shoetops; the curve was a little less off the plate to his glove side than it was to righties.

Kimbrel was more likely to pitch backward with a righthanded hitter at the plate, starting at bats with a curve almost one third of the time. Righties rarely swung at a first-pitch curve — just 22.2% of the time — but half of them were strikes. The tradeoff in count flexibility for the curve seems to be location, with curveballs a lot more concentrated low and away, and almost always off of the plate. When it works, it works; righthanded hitters had a whiff rate of 21.6% last year, which is high, but still unusual — especially when viewed through the lens of a lowish 37.0% swing rate. On swings themselves, RHH whiffed a hilarious 58.2% of the time.

According to the pitch classification data at Brooks, it would be a true statement to say that Kimbrel threw twice as many changeups in 2015 as he did in all previous seasons combined. Whether to consider a change part of his arsenal now is I suppose an open question, but Kimbrel’s fastball heatmap against RHH is one reason to think a change is really not that necessary right now. Doesn’t it look like Kimbrel’s bread and butter fastball is one right down the middle? It’s the kind of thing that might happen if a pitch was just so hard to hit that finesse may not be needed.

Finesse is something Kimbrel seems to have anyway; he walked 14 batters on full counts in 2015, but just 2 of those walks came with runners on base. Kimbrel appears to be reversing time with his velocity, but even if that began to slip, we’ve seen how great he can be with slightly lower readings, and that finesse is something Kimbrel seems sure to be able to tap into as needed. The Red Sox did give up quite a bit to get Kimbrel, but they did get a knockout reliever — one who seems poised to toy with AL East batters on a more regular basis in 2016.

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As fourth outfielders and most-featured bench players go, you could do a whole lot worse than Chris Young, signed by the Red Sox to a two year deal for $13 million on December 2nd. Comfortable at all three outfield spots and straight off his best campaign at the plate since a shoulder injury in early 2012, Young offers some pop with a hitting style that is more than a little unusual — and a batting average likely to be very pedestrian.

For the 32-year-old Young, gone are the days when he was a 25/25 threat in Arizona. But if Young can hold on to his ever-so-slightly-below-average defense over the next two seasons, he can be in Boston what he was in New York last year: a complementary player that actually complements the Red Sox roster. In a best case but realistic scenario, he could be even better.

What Went Right in 2015

Defensively, Young was still more than useful, shuttling around the Yankees outfield and grading only slightly below average in most advanced fielding metrics. Young’s story, though, has been about recovering some of that offense that was missing in 2012 and 2013, and which only started to come around toward the end of 2014. What made him seem “back” was a .453 slugging percentage, solidly above average and right in line with his best years in his mid-20s. And while that boost was real, part of that slugging percentage was singles; he improved his batting average by 30 points in 2015 to .252. In almost the exact same number of at bats, he had exactly 20 doubles for the second year running, though he did increase his home run total from 11 to 14, thanks in part to three bombs he hit off Alexi Ogando.

Young may always be something of a three true outcomes player, but his 20.5% strikeout rate in 2015 was an improvement over his 22.4% career rate. Young also boasted a passable on-base percentage of .320, thanks to a strong 8.4% walk rate. You’ve already heard the main story with Young in 2015, though: he was dramatically better against lefties than against righties, crushing southpaws to the tune of a .327/.397/.575 slash line.

Young has generally done better against lefties, especially in the power department, but last year was the most pronounced platoon split of his career. That’s a good thing, if that were to continue. No, it’s not wonderful to slash an abysmal .182/.246/.339 line against righthanders, what with most pitchers throwing with that hand — but the normal rules don’t really apply to bench players. For fourth outfielders who tend to play about half time, it’s an asset to bring things to the table that are particularly useful at particular times. Jackie Bradley, Jr.’s strong splits in the opposite direction in 2015 offer an opportunity, and had Young been merely halfway decent against all pitchers in 2015, he may not have looked like the highly marketable player the Red Sox snatched up well before most complementary players found jobs.

What Went Wrong in 2015

While Young’s .339 TAv against lefties in 2015 was something to behold, the .207 TAv it came with against RHP could be an albatross around Young’s neck. It’s hard to get a righty-favorable matchups on a half-time basis, and Bradley is the only handcuff on the team that really fits Young as a platoon partner. It would be nice to be able to spell Rusney Castillo when Castillo is not necessarily in a position to succeed (also against RHP), but you can’t have everything. Young is an above replacement level player, but he may not be for long.

There was a time when Young was thought of as a raw but toolsy defender, the kind of outfielder who stuns with his speed from time to time but who ran awkward routes a little too often to capitalize on his talents. Young seems to have lost a step, though, putting up a -2.0 Base Running Runs total in 2015. Defensive metrics back up that story. Where they once had Young bouncing from solidly below average to solidly above, he may no longer be the fielder he was — a -5.9 Framing Runs Above Average total put him lagging behind most outfielders. What’s worse, Young has had more and more difficulty playing in center field in recent seasons. As his time at that position has dropped precipitously, the range component of UZR makes that drop look prudent. In just 90.2 innings in 2015, UZR has Young frittering away more than two runs as compared to the average center fielder. It’s ridiculous to cut up partial seasons of defensive metrics into even smaller slices, and even more ridiculous to draw conclusions from them — but time catches up with us all. The good news: between Betts, Castillo and Bradley, Young is unlikely to man center very often in Boston.

Outlook for 2016

Young will be mixed and matched in the outfield, but next to Brock Holt, he’s probably going to look less like a Swiss Army Knife and more like a steak knife being used one too many ways. There’s every reason to think that Young can keep the power he’s always shown with his shoulder in one piece, and every reason to think he can keep up a strong walk rate. Still, you may find yourself wishing from time to time that Bryce Brentz batted from the left side.

It’s a brand-new world for Young, who is now no stranger to the AL East — or to Fenway. Young has apparently made peace with embracing who he is as a hitter; someone who pulls the ball and puts it in the air more than any other hitter the Red Sox have rostered for at least a half season over the last five years. The closest thing might be Cody Ross — and given the career renaissance Ross enjoyed battering left field at Fenway, that’s not necessarily a bad thing. For his career, Young has played in 21 games at Fenway, slashing a silly .344/.431/.623 in 73 plate appearances. No wonder he’s looking forward to looking out at the Monster on a more regular basis.

There’s almost no way that can continue, and yet we can’t rule out that Fenway might fit Young much, much better than most hitters who join the team, because his fly-ball rate really is particularly high, and because while his 58.8% pull rate in 2015 was a career high, the trend line doesn’t make it seem like an aberration. The Green Monster may fit Young in more ways than one, too; even when Young was a plus defender overall, his arm was a liability in his game. We’re fresh off the most stark reminder we may ever get that paying left in Boston isn’t necessarily easy, but should Young find himself out there regularly, shorter throw distances might have his overall defensive profile playing up.

As a “three-plus” or fourth outfielder, Young does give the Red Sox some real options, and it’s entirely possible we’ll see him win a game or two all by himself. He may have been a little more expensive than Jonny Gomes and he may not be the same kind of good luck charm, but Young does bring a lot to the table.

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The very-young-and-very-veteran Red Sox were lined up with just three players eligible for arbitration as of a few weeks ago; Robbie Ross, Joe Kelly and Junichi Tazawa. On Friday, Kelly settled for an arbitration salary of $2.6M. Ross and the Red Sox are working on a reported narrow divide. Tazawa did not settle — and so he became one of the 33 players (out of 156 to file for arbitration) to exchange an arbitration figure with his team. Tazawa filed at $4.15M, the Red Sox $2.7M.

Player and team are pretty entrenched, making a settlement at this point a little more complicated.

In baseball’s version of arbitration, the figure exchange gets the process partly underway before the arbitration hearing ever starts; both sides are forced to come up with a number that they could actually defend, unlike days or even minutes before figures are exchanged, when parties are otherwise free to be as unreasonable as they please. Tazawa’s representatives and the Red Sox didn’t move very close to the middle, however — player and team are pretty entrenched, making a settlement at this point a little more complicated than it might normally have been.

The $1.45M gap between Tazawa and the team is not an outlier, exactly, but in those 33 cases in which figures were exchanged, there aren’t too many that have wider gaps, especially in terms of percentages. Some of the widest gaps are for unusual kinds of players, like something-more-than-platoon-hitters in Lucas Duda ($1.5M gap), Brandon Belt ($2.2M) and Mitch Moreland ($1.325). The biggest gap belongs to fringe-starter-turned-ace Jake Arrieta ($5.5M) Quite a few of the widest gaps, though, are relievers like Tazawa. In Zach Britton’s second of four turns in arbitration, his figure is $2.3M apart from that of the Orioles. The Rangers and Shawn Tolleson are $1.3M apart. And the Yankees and Aroldis Chapman are a whopping $4.1M apart with their figures in what should be Chapman’s last turn in arbitration — just short of Tazawa’s filing figure.

It may be that the market is still struggling a bit to catch up with some of the large relief contracts that were signed this offseason, and that were reflected in some trade values, as well. Still, the Red Sox and Tazawa don’t care anymore about how they got here — that’s part of the beauty of this style of arbitration. All that matters now is that they are here. And at this point, both the Red Sox and Tazawa and his reps really have just one course: take their case to a hearing, or try to return to settlement talks that may not have gotten very far through last week.

The Game

The CBA spells out what the arbitration panel can and can’t take into account in deciding between a player’s figure and his team’s. The main ingredient, of course, is on-field performance. The player’s previous salary also figures in, though, especially in cases like Tazawa’s when the player has already been eligible for arbitration in previous seasons. The CBA also requires that the panel “give particular attention” to the salaries of other players at, under, or one level above the player in terms of the year-to-year arbitration ladder. For players in their last go-round in arbitration like Tazawa, that includes free agency.

One way to think of it is that the factors that will be considered point to a particular “ideal” number, which is usually somewhere lower than the team’s figure but higher than the player’s figure. The parties may not agree on what that “ideal” number actually is (and they’re unlikely to talk about it with each other), but they may not be that far apart. If you think about the arbitration process as being about how close each party is to that “ideal” number, it becomes a neat little game.

For example, pretend that the “ideal” salary for Tazawa were $4M, but that the team had come in at $2M and Tazawa had filed $5M as his figure. The analysis would go like this: Tazawa’s number would be twice as likely to be picked by the arbitration panel as the team’s $2M. If the parties looked to settle before the hearing, then, they’d build in those risks about that way; you’d expect them to agree to be twice as close to Tazawa’s number as the team’s, and they’d end up settling right around that “ideal” number, $4M. The “midpoint” between $2M and $5M might be a point of conversation, but little more than that; $4M would loom larger in those negotiations than would $3.5M.

The sticky part is that the parties may not agree on what the “ideal” number really is, and that may be the sticking point that is responsible for most of the cases that actually go to a hearing. Most teams have their own projection system for arbitration salaries, and it’s hard to to imagine that the Red Sox aren’t one of those teams. If a projection system spit out a particular number — say, $3.5M — there’s good reason to treat that as the “ideal” number. With the limited universe of information eligible to be considered by the panel, a good projection can take most of the right things into account.

The Player

We don’t know what the Red Sox have in mind as an “ideal” number for Tazawa this year, but we do have a damned good projection: those generated by Matt Swartz and published at MLB Trade Rumors, which do have Tazawa projected at $3.3M. Again, there’s no way for that number to come out of the formal arbitration process at this point; if Tazawa and the Red Sox go to a hearing, the number will be $2.7M or $4.15M.

Both parties may (privately) think the “ideal” number is $3.3M or close to it, and right now, the midpoint between their filed numbers is $3.425M — pretty damned close to “ideal,” despite the sizable gap between the filed numbers. Still, the team is closer to the “ideal” number than to the midpoint, and it stands to reason that an arbitration panel is more likely to pick the Red Sox’s number than Tazawa’s number. Just running the numbers as a function of how close they are to an “ideal” $3.3M, there’d be an almost 60% chance of the Red Sox winning. If the parties were to settle right now and they agreed on what the “ideal” number should be, they’d be likely to hedge closer to the team’s figure, and maybe closer to $3.3M than $3.425.

There’s a wild card here, though. Everything above would apply best if Tazawa were still on year 2 of three arbitration years. The only things that could change a panel’s math since those MLB Trade Rumors numbers came out would be other arbitration cases settled this offseason. Since Tazawa is in his last year, though, the free agent deals we’ve seen this offseason could also figure in — and with the unexpectedly significant deals executed by the likes of Darren O’Day this offseason, the “ideal” number in the minds of the Red Sox and Tazawa’s agents could be higher.

The market has treated good relievers differently this winter than it has in the recent past, and the Red Sox and Tazawa will both have that in mind.

If you were pressed to choose between Shawn Kelley and Junichi Tazawa on a one-year deal in 2016, at equal salaries, who would you pick? How about Mark Lowe? Maybe those answers aren’t that clear, but even with his struggles at the end of 2015, few wouldn’t be happier to take Tazawa than to take total wild cards in Neftali Feliz or David Hernandez, both of whom signed one-year deals for $3.9M this winter. It’s not an apples-to-apples comparison — the panel can look at these free agent numbers, but they won’t give them the same weight that last-year arbitration comps will have. Nonetheless, the market has treated good relievers differently this winter than it has in the recent past, and the Red Sox and Tazawa will both have that in mind.

In the end, the late-inning gold rush this winter could push both parties’ ideas of Tazawa’s “ideal” number not just higher, but beyond their $3.425M midpoint, maybe to $3.5M. That’s not a huge difference from $3.3M, but it would push the “ideal” number to the other side of the midpoint, at least in Tazawa’s eyes — and if the parties don’t agree on which side of the midpoint the “ideal” number is, a hearing could become more likely. This winter’s free agency could really be enough, though, to make Tazawa’s $4.15M a more likely panel award than the $2.7M figure of the Red Sox. If that’s the case, that could encourage Tazawa to put negotiations on hold and head to a hearing.

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There’s a powerful trend: the more horizontal the movement, the greater the platoon split.

In April 2010, Max Marchi did a cluster analysis on the first three years’ worth of PITCHf/x data from right-handed pitchers and came up with 14 clusters, or categories. Not all right-handed pitchers’ offerings fall neatly into one of those categories, but there’s enough data in there that if one ran an analysis based on them, the results would be something to reckon with. Marchi returned to 12 of those categories a couple of weeks later and published some platoon splits. The results are pretty compelling

The short version is that there’s a powerful trend: the more horizontal the movement of a pitch, the greater the platoon split. Velocity also matters in an important way, with slower pitches less prone to positive platoon splits. I walked myself through the long version of this last week, which would give you more of an idea of what I’m getting at.

Here, I want to talk specifically about fastballs, using the second of those general principles: the more horizontal the movement, the greater the platoon split. Here are the three fastball clusters/categories Marchi used that had average PITCHf/x velocities over 90 mph: the “Sinker” (yellow), the “Heater” (red), and the “Jumping Fastball” (orange). Movement presented from the catcher’s perspective.

The numbers inside are Marchi’s Run Value Per 100 Pitches calculations, giving you an idea of just how significant the differences are. Almost 1 run per 100 pitches is enough to make a “pretty good” pitch “pretty bad.” Still, these numbers don’t actually tell us that a “Sinker” fares much worse than a “Jumping Fastball” when a RHP faces a lefty hitter; they just tell us that when a RHP throws a “Sinker,” it does a lot worse against lefty hitters than it does against right-handed batters.

Pitchers with mainly horizontal offerings tend to have bigger platoon splits. A fastball/slider pitcher tends to have a hard time with that, but if most of the fastballs are true “sinkers” like the Marchi category? Let’s just say we all thought something like Justin Masterson’s .307/.409/.508 line against lefties in 2015 was within the realm of possibility before he ever put the uniform back on.

Not all of the sinkers thrown by Red Sox pitchers look even vaguely like the yellow “Sinker” category above. Naturally, not all have platoon splits so excruciatingly extreme. The only player here with laughably different platoon splits is Masterson; over the last two years, his fourseam was hit hard by hitters on both sides of the plate, but his sinker had a .288 batting average against with righties, while lefties tuned them up with a .345 average.

One thing we may be able to do with all this: track changes in a single pitch’s movement, and see where that leads us. This last season, Rick Porcello’s sinker didn’t sink as much as it did in the previous two (his best two seasons).

The result? As Porcello’s sinker had more rise, lefties were limited more, but righties had a lot more fun. In 2015, Porcello’s sinker had about the same kind of “rise” as that of Clay Buchholz. It’s hard to see that kind of reverse platoon split continuing, but there is some support for the idea that it should be less positive if the pitch’s movement is at a more vertical angle.

Joe Kelly has also seen his sinker get more rise as he’s pitched in the majors. The contrast is not as great as with Porcello, but once again: lefties generally had more success as the pitch’s movement was more vertical, and righties reaped the benefits. On that .449 SLG mark for lefties in 2015, note that in batting average, lefties dipped to just .279 on the pitch, after hitting over .300 in each of the previous three seasons.

The Marchi numbers seem to work well as a cross-check for individual pitchers’ individual pitches and their platoon splits; when they don’t check out, maybe it’s worth raising an eyebrow. As an example: Carson Smith and his low arm angle have kind of tilted the movement of his pitches; a right-hander’s movement plot tends to lay out in something close to a 45 degree angle from top left to bottom right. Smith, though, has almost no rise at all on his sinker, and his change actually drops as compared to a spinless pitch (he threw the change just three times to righties last year; 60 to lefties). Meanwhile, if you were to put Smith’s slider into one of Marchi’s categories, the best one might be his “slurve” — the only pitch to have had a greater positive platoon split than Marchi’s true “sinker.” I’m not sure if it’s really a slurve — if you correct for Smith’s tilt, it starts to look more like a tight curve — but based on what we know, we might expect lefties to have more success against Smith than they did in 2015.

There’s not much to teach the Red Sox. I’ve been up and down the pitching staff, and, coincidence or not, they seem to have a pretty good feel for the platoon splits of individual pitches, and no pitcher seems to be crossed up in terms of defying the Marchi numbers. In terms of understanding what we’re seeing, though, I think this movement/platoon split business seems to have a ton of applications. Here’s to trying it out in more contexts in 2016.

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With former Yankees fill-in Vidal Nuño in the fold and a more solid starter in Wade Miley included in the deal, the Mariners appear to have been perfectly happy to include Roenis Elias in the trade that landed Carson Smith in Boston. Where Elias fits in the Red Sox’s short-term plans is not so sure — President Dave Dombrowski indicated he could compete with Joe Kelly for a fifth starter’s role — but he certainly doesn’t have a rotation slot locked up the way Miley probably would have if he had remained with the team.

Things started out well for Elias when he joined the Seattle rotation at 25 years old. In 29 starts, Elias recorded fewer hits allowed then innings along with pedestrian walk and strikeout rates. As a result, simple ERA estimators like FIP made it look like Elias had nearly earned a respectable 3.85 ERA. In a more abbreviated 2015 season, however, neither Elias’ ERA nor his FIP were as complimentary of his pitching.

Not much changed with Elias’s peripherals in 2015, when he threw 115.1 innings in 20 starts and two relief appearances; a slight drop in strikeout rate was mitigated by an even slighter drop in walk rate, and he yielded hits almost exactly as often. His home run rate appeared to do most of the 2015 damage. Had he been an AL team last year, a 0.9 HR/9 would have given Elias a rate as good as the top-ranked Astros, but the swing to 1.2 HR/9 would have tied him with the last place Tigers.

Bad luck in 2015? Not necessarily. Elias had a 4.37 Deserved Run Average in 2015. What’s more, it looks like Elias may have been tremendously lucky in 2014 — his 4.98 DRA that season was 1.14 points higher than the ERA he ended up with. He may actually have improved in 2015, but as far as DRA is concerned, “improved” didn’t exactly mean “good.”

With some ups and downs along the way, Elias’s pitch mix in 2015 was almost exactly the same as it was the season before. Elias threw his curveball about as often as pitchers not named Rich Hill throw curveballs, 22.31% of the time. He also featured his changeup about as much as a pitcher ever does, maybe stretching the limit at 35.47% of the time. The occasional sinker (9.83%) helped him stay away from his fourseam (42.38%) about as much he could.

Elias is not the soft-tosser that kind of pitch mix might suggest, though. Brooks Baseball had his average fourseam release speed at 92.37 mph, a bit above average for a lefty. As noted by our Bryan Grosnick in BP’s Transaction Analysis of the trade, Elias’s curveball is sometimes very good. In Hill, we saw another lefty play up his curveball by throwing high fastballs that stayed in the same plane for a longer time.

Hill, however, throws his curveball for strikes — Elias throws more curveballs off of the plate, and in on right-handed hitters. To keep his fastball working with the curve, it looks like he’s not a “high fastball” or “low fastball” guy — he’s more of a “middle fastball” guy.

Unfortunately for Elias, in 2015 that also made him a “.556 slugging percentage against fastball” guy. Maybe there’s room for improvement with Elias, but for now, it’s hard to dream of upside. His fit in Boston may not really be in the rotation anyway. Grosnick put it like this in BP’s Transaction Analysis:

He could possibly be a fine fifth starter on a second-division team … maybe even the Red Sox if everything breaks wrong. But on a team looking to upgrade their rotation, Elias is a swingman, a depth piece, and the guy you count on to stick around and fiddle if the city is already on fire.

Note that Grosnick did not say “long reliever.” In a relief role, Elias could potentially throw his curve a bit more, but probably not much more — and he really can’t throw more changeups. If he were better in a relief role, it would probably be because of a tick up in velocity, not the benefit of seeing hitters just once. If anything, that might make him a better short relief candidate than a long relief one.

Maybe there’s room for improvement with Elias, but for now, it’s hard to dream of upside. His fit in Boston may not really be in the rotation anyway.

The reference to “swingman” is specific, but probably more accurate. It’s been a long time since we saw Ramiro Mendoza morph in and out of that role, but the key is to be available to start when needed. The days of the swingman may be numbered in the game, with more and more spot starts made by minor league starters. If Elias bounces in and out of the rotation, “out” may mean “Pawtucket rotation.”

The Red Sox also have no more options on Steven Wright, who probably fits best as a true long reliever — maybe even as a “mop up guy.” As Grosnick put it, Elias may only be a rotation option “if everything breaks wrong.” Elias gets hit, but he does get outs — and in less-than-ideal circumstances, maybe that’s all we can ask for.

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The team that Dombrowski inherited has not been easy to change; of last year’s team, the only players to depart as free agents were Rich Hill and Craig Breslow, and while the former’s late-season flash of brilliance may be missed, the latter was unlikely to have a pronounced role. A few days after those players elected free agency, the Red Sox outrighted Alexi Ogando and Allen Craig and his now-onerous contract to the minors, and to this point, those four players and Ryan Cook (lost on waivers) are the only ones from the 2015 major league picture who may not be among the rows of smiling faces in the 2016 team photo.

Dombrowski has managed to put his stamp on this team already, but what he hasn’t done is violently shake up the roster.

Fully purged of major league Craigs, the front office made its first major move of the offseason in picking up a new one. The addition of Craig Kimbrel almost definitely made the bullpen better, but also made it more difficult to upgrade. The REd Sox hope to enjoy more complete years from the better-utilized Junichi Tazawa and Koji Uehara, and Joe Kelly is too good to not gamble on, especially in light of potential need in the bullpen. Tommy Layne and Steven Wright both have something to offer if used in their optimal roles, and both are out of options. Robbie Ross may be the most spare of spare bullpen parts, and yet after Uehara, his may have been the steadiest of hands in the bullpen last season.

Where position players have those pesky positions to worry about, one can always upgrade a starting rotation with an ace. But while the addition of David Price may or may not fix the rotation, it does do to the starting crew what the Kimbrel pickup does to the bullpen; further changes to the rotation may be difficult to the point of leaving value on the table. It may be that no team would value Clay Buchholz as highly as do the Red Sox, and if you’re looking for someone to bet against Rick Porcello, don’t look at Dombrowski. Trading Eduardo Rodriguez would threaten to make this team the post-dynasty Yankees, and while the bulk innings of decent quality contributed by Wade Miley are why he’s valuable, they also make him something of an upgrade bottleneck.

Dombrowski has managed to put his stamp on this team already, but what he hasn’t done is violence to the roster. No valuable player has been cut, no useful but below-average player marginalized. He does have a mandate for change, though, and may yet declare some contract money a sunk cost, or some decent player not good enough to worry about losing. If the pitching staff is all but calcified–and that’s not a given–change may be coming on the position player side of things.

Small problem: every position player currently slated for a starting role is either a Red Sox institution, within a year and a half of signing a long-term deal, or part of the team’s young core. We could quibble about whether Jackie Bradley, Jr. fits in that last category, but with a solid platoon match in Chris Young on board, Bradley wouldn’t be an easy subtraction either.

The “backup plan” part of the offseason tends to come later in the offseason than December, and so even though the Red Sox are likely to pick around for rehabbing pitchers and journeymen outfielders like the rest of the sport, that’s not what we’re likely to see out of the team in Nashville. None of us know what the Red Sox know, and we may not agree with their priorities even if we knew them and had the same information. But ask yourself: if you were tasked with re-making the Red Sox into a contender and agreed there were no more roster holes to fill, what would you be looking to do at the Winter Meetings?

The Red Sox may have all manner of conversations this week, but Hanley Ramirez may dominate the team’s end of the rumor mill.

Chances are you’d wish you could snap your fingers and make the contracts of Pablo Sandoval and/or Hanley Ramirez disappear. And since the former would be about as easy to move as Benjie Molina standing between a runner and home plate, you’d probably focus your energy on trying to move Ramirez. You wouldn’t be playing with house money anymore, but you would be playing with house time; the Red Sox don’t need to do anything this week. Reality is setting in around the game right now — a deal like the Great Dodgers Contract Purge is not likely to happen, but depending on what happens this week, the Red Sox could end up in the right place at the right time by keeping their fingers on the pulse of possible Ramirez destinations.

Whether it’s in the rotation, bullpen or on the position player side, at this point the Red Sox would need to subtract to accommodate more additions, although the order of those don’t necessarily matter and Boston’s back-end starters could generate a ton of interest this week in a new spending climate they helped create. The Red Sox may have all manner of conversations this week, but Hanley Ramirez should dominate the team’s end of the rumor mill. What would that look like, you ask? Well, about that…

With no uber-prospect knocking on the door for playing time at first base, the Red Sox have almost nothing to lose by trying Han-Ram there to start the season. All it has to be is better than awful; with David Ortiz out of the picture after the 2016 season, a worst case scenario has Ramirez playing out the last two years of his contract as a potentially overpaid but eminently useful DH. That could make for an uncomfortable 2016, but it does mean that the Red Sox won’t just cut Ramirez. Dump in a trade that requires eating a ton of money, sure, but not cut.

Just as Ramirez’s defensive shortcomings and positional mystery make him a wild card for Boston, they make him very difficult to move. His contract is so big that if he’s traded somewhere to be a first baseman, that team is betting on him being a first baseman; an expensive backup option is as unlikely as Ramirez displacing a young, established starter. What the Red Sox are looking for in sizing up potential trade partners, then, are three things: 1) teams that can play Ramirez at DH now, 2) teams with a hole at first base who are also a little desperate; or 3) teams who currently have a plan in place for first base, but that can move that player somewhere else on the diamond (probably outfield). All three kinds of teams would be better trade matches if they had a bad contract or two of their own. Sure, there could be some team out there willing to give Ramirez another shot to play elsewhere in the infield (third base, if anything), but that’s a matter of lines of communication, not of advancing talks.

With the acknowledgement that in trade talks, any team can shut things down unilaterally, some fits we might hear:

• Baltimore Orioles. When Nick Cafardo reported at the end of last month that the Red Sox were looking to move Ramirez, he followed that with this: “The Mariners, Orioles, and Angels seem to be the targets, and all three make sense.” It’s not clear to me whether that’s part of what Cafardo was reporting, or whether that was just his opinion, but all three teams are probably priorities if the Red Sox are actively looking for fits. The awkward part of this math is that the Red Sox might look at Chris Davis if they did move Ramirez — but the Orioles are unlikely to trade for Ramirez unless Davis is already off the board. Mark Trumbo is actually a fine first baseman, which would slot Ramirez nicely at DH — and although the Orioles dealt with a little catcher logjam by trading Steve Clevenger for Trumbo, they may have been a little surprised when Matt Wieters accepted their qualifying offer. Prospect Chance Sisco may be two years away from contributing for Baltimore, and catchers that far from the majors are anything but sure things. Although it would involve taking on two players with current question marks at once, a deal that sent both Ramirez and Christian Vazquez to the Orioles could start a conversation, with Wieters sharing time with Blake Swihart and Ortiz in Boston for 2016.

• Seattle Mariners. I don’t see how the Angels fit in trade; C.J. Cron may be replaceable at DH, but Albert Pujols may need that spot — and since the team doesn’t have a similar contract to send back. acquiring Ramirez in a salary dump seems like a very unlikely way for new GM Billy Eppler to put his first stamp on the team. While Trumbo’s first team may not be a fit, though, his third might be as promising a destination for Ramirez as his fourth. The conversation would almost definitely be short; if we hear rumors of talks and a declaration from Jerry Dipoto that he’s not interested, that might be the kiss of death for Boston’s trade chances. Why? Because as Cafardo reported or observed, the team actually does make sense, and so Dipoto passing might be read as acting from a position of better-than-market knowledge about Ramirez. The Trumbo swap means that some mix of Jesus Montero, Seth Smith and Shawn O’Malley may cover most of the 1B/DH playing time, and there’s enough flexibility there for Ramirez to fit in comfortably in some way. The years involved may end up being the problem, if Dipoto is actually open to the idea: the DH spot may be needed for Nelson Cruz not too far down the line.

• Toronto Blue Jays. If one division rival makes sense, why not another? The Blue Jays had success veering wildly toward offense, and yet if Jose Bautista is in right field and Edwin Encarnacion is at first, there’s playing time available at DH with Ramirez almost definitely an upgrade over Justin Smoak. Dombrowski’s Canadian counterpart may prefer to keep DH open for regular rest for Bautista, Encarnacion and especially Troy Tulowitzki, but Mark Shapiro would probably listen — and if the talks expanded to include Wade Miley, R.A. Dickey and a prospect or two, they might gain some traction. Heck, you might even fit Alexi Ogando into a swap.

• Atlanta Braves. Hear me out. No, the team doesn’t have a DH slot to use, and no, they aren’t looking to move Freddie Freeman. What they do have, though, is a need for some kind of outfield bopper, a willingness to make big changes and a significant commitment to Hector Olivera — with a lot of uncertainty about whether Olivera can actually play in the outfield. If the Red Sox really do eat a ton of the money owed Ramirez, the Braves have little to lose. And while the Braves did get some salary relief in taking on the puzzling Olivera, they can trade that contract at sticker price. Characterize it as unlikely, but possible — even though coming across a roster with Ramirez, Michael Bourn and Nick Swisher on it would be like coming across a bunch of furniture you left next to your apartment building dumpster a few months earlier.

• Miami Marlins. Admit it, trading Bad Hanley to the Marlins would feel at least as good as trading Good Hanley felt bad. If a deal were pitched to Jeffrey Loria as some kind of expanded roster sharing, maybe he bites? And while the team wants what seems like an unrealistic return for Martin Prado, the 11,000,000 dollars remaining on the Prado contract seem to form the makings of a promising trade scenario. The Marlins could be willing to try Ramirez at third with Prado gone, and if that didn’t work — or if they didn’t want to try — Ramirez makes for a nice platoon pairing with first baseman Justin Bour. This would be a salary dump kind of move, but adding Prado to uber-utilityman Brock Holt would allow the Red Sox to break camp with just four true outfielders, providing insurance for a Travis Shaw experiment and potentially enabling the team to carry all three of Blake Swihart, Ryan Hanigan and Christian Vazquez.

• San Diego Padres. Reports are that the team would be willing to move James Shields, but that they don’t want to eat money, and that they’d like a middle infielder back in return. That we’re hearing that Shields is available is some indication that he’s really available. And had Shields pitched about as well as expected in 2016, his contract would still be effectively a liability, with only his older seasons left on his deal and with the winner’s curse of the Padres paying more for him than anyone (including the Red Sox) were willing to pay a year ago. Sure, they could get an infielder back without kicking in Shields money — if they took another contract back. And while the optics of having two diminished recent Dodgers in the lineup may be a hard sell in San Diego, there’s room here for a match — and with Yonder Alonso traded to Oakland for Drew Pomeranz, default first baseman Wil Myers could slot back into the outfield. Deven Merrero would seem like a small price to pay to swap Ramirez for Shields, even if the Red Sox had to eat $30M of the $68M owed Ramirez while picking up the Shields tab. Wade Miley might also be a candidate to be included in that kind of deal, although it would change the dollars involved — and if the Red Sox trade Miley first, Shields/Ramirez becomes a lot more interesting.

This week should be as fun a Winter Meetings period as it ever is, but if your heart is with the Red Sox, there’s really no anxiety factor — the team can only make a strong offseason stronger, and there’s no way for failure to act to be a failure. We’ve only begun to see Dave Dombrowski remake the roster, with only the easiest parts out of the way. Regardless of the circumstances and whether or not it’s through one of the matches above, trading Hanley Ramirez would pave the way for even more changes — and it may be the biggest possible win the front office could pull off this week.

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The Red Sox entered last season with three lefties in line for the major league bullpen, and PECOTA was not very impressed with any of them. Robbie Ross was pegged for a 0.2 WARP season and Craig Breslow was projected to contribute at a replacement level 0.0 WARP. Tommy Layne, with a recent if small history of success, seemed dragged down by iffy peripherals, and was given a -0.2 WARP projection. As I wrote in April, Layne had been dominant against lefties in particular, making him a promising part of the bullpen as a lefty matchups man. As I found out the afternoon that piece was posted, that didn’t mean Layne was a lock to actually stay in the majors all season.

Layne made his way back to the major league roster by the end of that month, excelling in May (1.64 ERA in 11 innings) and sticking with the club for the rest of the year. Used as a true matchups man, he found success in that role; to the extent that a late-blooming journeyman LOOGY can be a bright spot of the bullpen moving forward, that’s what he appears to be.

What Went Right

Layne’s success starts and ends with the 102 plate appearances he tallied against left-handed hitters. The .248 OBP they managed against him was more “very good” than “outstanding,” but while pitching around the zone meant a predictably high walk rate (more on that later), that approach also had the desired effect: lefties slugged just .170 against Layne, and none of those 102 batters managed to hit a long ball.

Against lefties, Layne fared exactly as well as Dallas Keuchel and Wade Davis. We’ll take that.

Last year, a low slugging mark helped keep Layne’s TAv down to just .136 against lefty hitters; of sixty-three lefty relievers who pitched in at least 30 games in 2014, only Sean Doolittle had a better mark (.097 TAv against lefties). Even in his most wintry of Winter Soldier relief seasons, Zach Britton (.139 TAv) didn’t do better than Layne. Aroldis Chapman (.151 TAv) didn’t do better than Layne.

Still, Layne’s brief but dominant 2014 LOOGY experience seemed to offer little beyond confirmation that Layne threw with his left arm and could have success in that role — not that he would. If the Doolittle-Britton-Chapman company was the kind that Layne needed to keep in order to call his 2015 season a success, the odds seemed heavily stacked against him. And yet…

Layne ended the 2015 season with a .172 TAv against lefties, behind only a who’s who of baseball’s top pitchers who faced lefties for at least 50 PA. He ranked behind only Javier Lopez, Britton, Mark Melancon, Carter Capps, Brandon Maurer and Dellin Betances among relief pitchers. Against lefties, Layne fared exactly as well as Dallas Keuchel and Wade Davis. We’ll take that, even if it’s hard to explain how he did it. When the pressure was on, Layne was only counted on when he was in a position to succeed; according to Baseball Reference, Layne held batters to a .436 OPS in High Leverage situations.

What Went Wrong

No baseball player gets the platoon advantage 100% of the time, and in Layne’s case, he still ended up facing more RHH (105) than LHH (102). Even though his splits were so extreme that on paper, he looks like he was out there for RHH (21 innings) quite a bit less than LHH (26.2 innings). Just as Layne tended to pitch in high leverage situations when he’d be able to face a lefty, he sputtered when used less strategically: a .713 OPS for batters in Medium Leverage situations, and a bloated .795 OPS in Low Leverage.

Layne was no Keuchel against righties, who managed a .310 TAv against him. If you’re going to hack it as a matchups reliever, it makes sense to judge you based on how well you perform in the intended matchups. Still, it’s not like the other innings don’t count. Layne yielded a 26.5% LD% against righties, a not-insignificant sign that they had a pretty easy time squaring him up. A .517 slugging percentage allowed against them tells the same story.

Between Layne’s poor results against RHH on batted balls and very good results against LHH, you can’t really blame him for closing his eyes and wishing as hard as he could that he could just kind of skip RHH. Since he had a little more control over those situations than wishes, the fact that he did skip more than a few RHH is probably not a question of command. Layne’s 6.86 BB/9 against RHH is understandable, but no less horrendous than it sounds. That walk rate is tantamount to an admission that Layne has little business pitching to major league RHH. Layne’s performance against RHH in 21 innings was enough to raise the entire team’s ERA from 4.30 to 4.34.

Outlook for 2016

To the extent Layne finds success, it’s probably always going to feel fluky; that’s the nature of cutting up a reliever’s small sample of innings into even smaller pieces. But there is hope. In the calculation of WARP that depends on FAIR_RA, Layne was barely helpful in 2015: a 0.2 WARP. In the newer calculation of WARP that depends on DRA and more variables we’ve come to trust, Layne’s WARP skyrockets to 0.7, a strong figure for a pitcher with an innings total under 50. Not all walks are made equal; if you’re walking the right batters on purpose, maybe it’s not luck when you then seem to get more than your fair share of ERA credit.

Despite its overall lack of success, the Red Sox rotation did surprisingly well in 2015 in terms of pitching deep in games, ranking 11th in baseball with an average of 5.85 innings per start. If the Red Sox can maintain or even improve that figure, they won’t be tempted to lean on Layne for several batters at a time the way they did last April. And the more Layne pitches to his strength, the better off he’ll be.

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